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CHAPTER I. ABSTRACT 
An estimable model of the demand for and marginal cost of air 
pollution abatement as a public good is proposed. The model is derived 
from economic theory, employing median voter dominance for the demand 
side and cost minimizing behavior on the marginal cost side. Price and 
income elasticities are estimated and compared with estimates from other 
studies that use different approaches. 
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CHAPTER II. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Air quality can be thought of in at least two ways. One, it can be 
viewed as the inverse of air pollution. Air pollution, in turn, can be 
considered an externality, in the context of joint production of a 
private good and a public good (or in this case, a public "bad"). 
Another approach, taken here, would be to consider air quality a positive 
public good demanded in the form of air pollution abatement. As a public 
good, air pollution abatement is nonrival in consumption and it is not 
feasible to exclude nonpayers. Under these conditions, the private 
market will not function. This public good is demanded by the public and 
provided by a figurative joint firm of the state government and private 
Industry. By joint firm it is meant that the state government and 
private industry work collaboratively to abate emissions. The state 
government provides the inspection, monitoring and other enforcement of 
federal, state and local air pollution laws, while private industry, in 
response to governmental regulations and enforcement of those regula­
tions, makes the necessary investment to control emissions to achieve 
desired air quality. 
Air pollution can be considered either from the standpoint of a 
stock, by which abatement reduces, or a flow, in that new emissions are 
either abated or somehow "consumed" or dissipated. Both viewpoints are 
maintained in this study. That is, air pollution emissions and the 
attendent abatement begin each year with a soiled environment on January 
1 and both the level of abatement during the year and the stock of 
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pollution from the previous year are relevant; there are carryovers of 
stocks of air pollutants from year to year such that they influence 
people's demand for air quality. Accordingly, this way of looking at air 
quality is as tons of emissions abated by the state governments and 
private industry given the ambient air pollution level. For example, 
suppose that citizen preferences for clean air increase through say, some 
environmental awareness campaign. Industry in that state had been 
dumping 300,000 tons of particulates a year into the air. Now only 
200,000 tons a year is considered acceptable. Through governmental 
action (in response to citizen demands, stricter emissions regulations 
are enacted and enforced) and industry investments (in new air pollution 
abatement equipment and workers to run it) an additional 100,000 tons per 
year is abated rather than be released into the atmosphere. The greater 
the preferences for clean air, ceteris paribus, the larger the number of 
tons will be abated. 
The central problem with any air pollution abatement model is that 
there is no market for air pollution abatement. There are no prices but 
the amount of air pollution abatement provided can be quantified. Adding 
to the difficulties are the problems of public good demand revelation and 
the process of public good supply. 
Taking the demand revelation first. Freeman (14, p. 62) catalogs 
three different approaches to public good demand. The first is to ask 
people to reveal their preferences, their willingness to pay for dif­
ferent quantities of a public good. This could be done with surveys or 
interviews. The problem with this is, of course, that there exist 
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incentives for individuals to understate their actual demand, to be a 
"free rider", if they feel their responses will have an effect on how 
much they must pay. A second approach is to use the relationship between 
public and private goods in consumption (or in production) and to use the 
private good's market data (price and quantity) to make estimates of 
public goods demand. This is referred to as the hedonic price technique. 
The third approach is to decide the level of public good provision 
through voting. The different proposals put forth by political parties 
and candidates will, in the long run, tend to be grouped around the pref­
erences of the median voter. Each voting district can then be taken as a 
sample unit, with the amount of the public good supplied approximating 
the median voter's preferences. 
The process of public good supply is ill-understood, and no 
completely satisfactory models exist. This task is made more complex by 
the joint-production nature of air pollution abatement (government and 
industry). 
This study will confine itself to stationary source air pollutants 
as the cause of degradation in air quality. Mobile source emission 
sources, largely automobiles, are not considered here. It is assumed 
therefore, that air environmental quality is a strongly separable 
aggregate - that the demands and supplies of different components: water 
pollution, land pollution, air pollution (stationary sources, e.g., 
industrial plants), air pollution (mobile sources, e.g., automobiles), 
can be considered in isolation. 
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CHAPTER III. REVIEW OF SELECTED RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The topic of provision of air pollution abatement touches upon 
several areas of the economics literature. These are the previous 
studies on the demand for clean air, studies of the benefits of environ­
mental improvement and the literature dealing with the demand for and 
supply of public goods. 
Demand for Clean Air 
The previous demand for clean air studies are of just two types: 
those using surveys and those using the hedonic price techniques. A 
third possibility, the median voter approach, has not been attempted. 
Hedonic price analysis 
Hedonic price analysis has been used most often in air quality 
studies to investigate the relationship between air pollution and 
property values. The technique is described by Freeman (14, p. 78): 
The hedonic technique is a method for estimating the 
implicit prices of the characteristics which differentiate 
closely related products in a product class. For example, 
houses constitute a product class differentiated by character­
istics such as number of rooms and size of lot. In principle, 
if there are enough models with different combinations of 
rooms and lot size, it is possible to estimate an implicit 
price relationship which gives the price of any model as a 
function of the quantities of its various characteristics. 
The coefficients of the characteristics are the implicit 
prices. For example, the difference in price between two 
models with different numbers of rooms but identical in all 
other respects is interpreted as the implicit price of 
additional rooms. 
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In practice, an equation is set up with the house price as the 
dependent variable and with the independent variables being site 
variables (e.g., number of rooms), neighborhood variables (e.g., crime 
rate) and environmental variables (e.g., air quality). The equation is 
estimated over an urban area and the resulting variable coefficients are 
implicit prices. Ridker and Henning (35) pioneered this type of study 
and found that property values declined in response to higher pollution 
levels. Most air quality property value hedonic price studies go no 
further than measuring this implicit price. Freeman (14) lists 15 such 
studies; only two proceed to the next stage: estimation of the inverse 
demand function (where price is the independent variable instead of 
quantity). This stage involves regressing the implicit price for air 
quality against the level of air quality, income and other household 
variables. The two studies that do estimate the inverse demand function 
for air quality are Harrison and Rubinfeld (20) and Nelson (31). Both 
studies found estimates for price elasticity of demand for air quality to 
be around -1.2 and income elasticity of demand to be approximately 1.0, 
When the inverse demand equation is estimated, some assumptions must 
be made about the supply of clean air. Harrison and Rubinfeld assume the 
supply to be perfectly inelastic, thus they are able to use single 
equation estimation methods as supply is now exogenous. Freeman (15, p. 
166) examines this: 
The question of which assumption, exogenous or endogenous 
supply, is more appropriate boils down to the speed of the 
supply side adjustment .... 
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For single-year hedonic models, air quality is necessarily fixed as 
state governments and private Industry move slowly in changing the level 
of abatement. Thus, supply is thought of in terms of the supply of clean 
air houses, whose stock would change very slowly. Therefore, in single-
year hedonic models making the assumption of inelastic supply is a 
realistic one. However, if a demand model is examined using a pooled 
data set of several years, then the assumption of institutional rigidity 
in supplying air pollution abatement and hence clean air is not appro­
priate. Looking ahead, just such a data sample is used in this study and 
therefore an appropriate supply model is formulated. 
Survey method 
Survey techniques have been used to value visibility (Randall et al. 
(34), Rowe et al. (37)), and other aesthetic preferences (Brookshire, 
Ives, and Schulze (8)). There have always been some questions (strategic 
bias, hypothetical bias, instrument bias) about surveys. Thus, although 
surveys may be internally consistent, there is a need for independent 
confirmation of the results. Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze and d'Arge (9) 
make such a comparison for an area of southern California using survey 
and hedonic approaches for valuing air quality. Within the theoretical 
construct of their model, they were unable empirically to reject the dual 
hypotheses that specify (p. 176) "... that survey responses will be 
bounded below by zero [hypothesis 1] and above by rent differentials 
derived from the estimated hedonic rent gradient [hypothesis 2]." This 
test provides "... evidence for the validity of survey methods as a 
means of determining the value of public goods." 
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Median voter approach 
No previous studies of the demand for air quality have used as their 
theoretical framework the median voter approach. The reasons for not 
pursuing this theoretic method are given by Freeman (14, p. 104) 
If some portion of pollution control costs is borne by 
the private sector, then the link between a vote on quantity 
and tax share or price is broken, and the vote can not be 
interpreted as revealing anything about the economic demand 
for pollution control. Also, the voting approach would only 
be applicable where both the benefits and the costs of the 
pollution control program fall entirely within the applicable 
political jurisdiction. If pollution spills across jurisdic­
tional boundaries, some of the benefits of pollution control 
will be realized outside the jurisdiction. No voting measure 
could capture these interjurisdictional spillovers. 
The model formulated in later chapters will deal with Freeman's 
objections by dealing explicitly with private sector costs and 
transboundary effects. 
Benefits of Environmental Improvement 
Benefits from air pollution abatement flow to the public from 
several sources. One is the improved health and reduced mortality that 
result from decreases in pollution-related diseases such as bronchitis, 
emphysema and cancer (Freeman, (14), p. 165). Different approaches have 
been suggested and used. Freeman prefers willingness-to-pay. He (p. 
167) 
. . . proposes that increases in longevity or reductions in 
the probability of death due to accident or illness be valued 
according to what an individual is willing to pay to achieve 
them. 
Crocker et al. (10), uses $340,000 is the willingness to pay for an 
expected life saved (as developed by Thaler and Rosen (39)). 
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A different method is the human capital approach. "It values each 
life lost at the present value of the expected stream of future earnings 
for that individual, had that individual's death been avoided" (Freeman, 
(14), p. 169). Lave and Seskin (24) estimate this figure to be $30,000. 
But this approach does not take into account a person's wlllingness-to-
pay or in Freeman's terms, the value of a statistical death avoided. Nor 
does this measure account for nonmarket production. 
Other benefits of clean air are the productivity benefits. Some of 
these benefits would be reduced agricultural damage from air pollutants, 
lessened materials damage, reduced water supply alteration (e.g., acid 
rain) and less household cleaning and soiling. Examples of the studies 
that examine these benefits are Waddell (49) and Heintz, Hershaft and 
Horak (50). 
These various estimates of the benefits of air pollution abatement 
are not all similar (e.g.. Lave and Seskin vs. Thaler and Rosen's 
estimate for average value of life) nor are they without statistical 
problems. Gerklng and Schulze (16, p. 230) argue that there are three 
types of specification error being committed by these benefit studies. 
There are errors in functional form, omitted variables and simultaneity. 
Most models use simple linear or log-linear specification - do these 
accurately approximate the true function? Omitted variables can cause 
estimates to be biased and inconsistent, but tests have shown that this 
is not serious with, for example. Lave and Seskin's study. Gerklng and 
Schulze (p. 230) argue that all the benefit studies use a reduced form 
(rather than a simultaneous approach) which gives misleading results; 
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Simple ordinary least squares estimation, however, may 
lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of all regression 
coefficients .... 
Demand for Public Goods 
Considering only the studies that provide empirical estimates of 
public good demand, there are two main types: surveys and voting. 
Survey approaches have been covered (in part) under the survey method 
section so only voting will be considered here. 
The predominant theoretical construct in this field is the median 
voter model. According to this theory, under a given set of conditions, 
politicians will tailor their platforms to appeal to the median voter's 
preferences. Therefore, the median voter's demands for governmentally 
provided public goods will be reflected in public expenditures for those 
goods. This theory is not without its critics however. Although fairly 
popular with economists, it is dismissed in the political science litera­
ture (18, p. 1133) as having thoroughly flawed assumptions: 
If the rule were strictly majoritarian and if each citizen 
had full information and an equal probability of participating 
in an expenditure decision (or if participation probabilities 
were unassociated with expenditure preferences), then the 
amount spent on each expenditure category would reflect exactly 
the citizen with median preferences. These informational, 
probability, and majoritarian assumptions are not, however, 
empirically accurate. 
On the other hand, Holcombe (22) conducts an empirical test of the median 
voter approach and finds, for Michigan school districts, that (p. 273) 
". . . the actual milage rate in the average district was not 
statistically different from the median voter's most preferred rate." 
11 
Romer and Rosenthal (36) review several economic studies using the 
median voter approach and conclude that most are flawed. These flaws 
consist of, in their terminology, the multiple fallacy and the fractile 
fallacy. Romer and Rosenthal explain (p. 150) the multiple fallacy: 
If expenditures everywhere were not those desired by the 
median voter but some multiple of this quantity, then the 
elasticity estimates would be unchanged but the multiple would 
be confounded in the Intercept. Since there are no prior 
constraints on [the intercept] that allow us to determine if 
the multiple is unity, we cannot know whether expenditures 
correspond to those desired by a voter with median income. 
Whether this multiple fallacy exists is mostly an empirical, not a 
theoretical, question. This study does not intend to explore this 
subject further, hence pending resolution, will assume a multiple of 
one. 
The fractile fallacy involves two parts: one, the theoretical 
developments using the median voter model that suggest if one substitutes 
any fractile for the median income, similar empirical results would be 
obtained. The second part of the fractile fallacy is failing to test the 
median voter model against alternative specifications. The median voter 
model developed here will explicitly treat median income thus satisfying 
the first part of the fractile fallacy. Alternative specifications will 
not be tested against the developed model, therefore allowing it to be 
criticized on those grounds. 
A study of particular note is one by Lovell (28), who uses the 
median voter approach and specifies a utility function for the median 
voter. Lovell also incorporates nonnormal distributions of income. 
Classics in the area of median voter models include studies by Bergstrora 
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and Goodman (4) (estimating price and income elasticities for police, 
parks and recreation), Borcherding and Deacon (6) (demand for local 
public services), and Barr and Davis (2) (explaining local public 
expenditures). These studies however, cover only the demand side. 
Supply of Public Goods 
There are several descriptive economic models that attempt to 
explain the governmental process of providing some level of public goods. 
These are mostly "reduced-form" models meaning that the estimated coef­
ficients are functions of the demand and supply parameters. In this 
case, only when the underlying structural model is exactly identified can 
values for the structural parameters he determined from reduced form 
estimates. But these studies do not even postulate a separate supply 
function. 
From the political science literature there seem to be several 
schools of thought concerning public goods supply. One is the incremen-
talist school which explains governmental expenditures with simple auto-
regressive rules such as, quoting Romer and Rosenthal (p. 144) "last 
years budget plus 5 percent." Another approach is actually a contro­
versy, socioeconomic variables vs. political variables; which has more 
explanatory power in explaining government expenditures? Lewis-Beck (27) 
comes down on the side of socioeconomic variables. Godwin and Shepard 
(18) postulate several "political linkage" models, using exclusively 
political variables. 
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Another approach altogether is taken by Niskanen (32) who sets up a 
bilateral monopoly (p. 618): 
The bureau [the government agency] 'sells' its service 
only to the government and the government 'buys' the service 
only from the bureau. This market, however, involves the 
exchange of some output for a budget than at a per unit price. 
... ray model of bureaucratic supply determines only the 
bureau's preferred output based on an assumption that the 
bureau acts to maximize its budget. 
Niskanen develops a model consisting of two parts, the first of 
which is a bureaucrat with a utility function which is maximized subject 
to a "discretionary" budget constraint yielding some optimal output. The 
second part is a model of a vote-maximizing legislator which also has two 
parts. One, oversight committees are packed with legislators whose 
district has a particular interest in the outcome hence increases supply 
past median desires and second, the legislator allocates his time between 
district specific activities and oversight activities. This latter 
yields results that a legislator whose district pays a small share of 
taxes spends most of his time on district specific activities. Niskanen 
examines several hypotheses derived from his model. The first is the 
overspending hypothesis: that government budgets are larger than those 
desired by the median voter. He concludes that (p. 635) ". . . 
conditions that increase the monopoly power of governments and bureaus 
lead to an increase in government expenditures." Second, Niskanen 
reviews some studies comparing the relative efficiency of government and 
private industry providing the same services and concludes (p. 638-9) 
Both overspending and production inefficiency appear to 
be a function of bureaus at the margin of their present size. 
... In summary then, these studies suggest that 
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Inefficiency is not a necessary characteristic of the supply 
of government services. 
Other hypotheses discussed are the oversupply hypothesis, the overcapi­
talization hypothesis, and the bureaucratic structure hypothesis. Taking 
them in turn, Niskanen feels that bureaus supply more of a public good 
than is demanded (given the high costs of oversight). Overcapitalization 
comes about because of bureaucrats preference for current over future 
spending. Bureaucratic structure implies that consolidation of bureaus 
increases costs. Niskanen feels that empirical evidence (when available) 
supports the hypotheses derived from his model. 
Dooming (11) develops a graphical multiperiod model of the actors in 
the implementation of pollution laws: the control agency, the emitter, 
and the citizen's group. He examines the effects of policy change on the 
control agencies budget and hence environmental quality. One interesting 
feature of the model is that the supply function of environmental quality 
is to the left of the efficient level due to the presence of discre­
tionary activities that the control agency bureaucrat could undertake in 
addition to environmental activities. 
None of the above studies formulates a supply function, much less an 
estimable one. One related area is that of nonprofit organizations. 
Blair, Ginsburg and Vogel (5) studied Blue Cross-Blue Shield and 
estimated average cost functions. They found that there appears to be a 
lack of incentive to minimize cost (through utilizing economies of scale) 
and therefore there was administrative slack. This study provides some 
evidence against assuming that governments provide services at least 
cost. 
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CHAPTER IV. IMPLICIT MARKETS AND TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS 
Implicit Markets and Transboundary Effects 
Implicit market describes a situation when a good or service is 
provided, but not through the normal market mechanism of exchange 
involving prices and quantities. Even in private goods markets, except 
for highly organized and visible ones such as agricultural commodities 
markets or the stock market, transactions data (prices and quantities) 
are well known only to Individuals directly involved. For public goods, 
there are no markets in terms of observable transactions. Often there 
are expenditure data, but defining quantities, especially for pure public 
goods, can be elusive. 
There are data on expenditures for air pollution abatement by 
government and private industry. If one had a good measure of the 
"level" of air quality provided, then using the identity: expenditures 
are equal to price times quantity, the per unit price theoretically could 
be determined. This price is implicit, hence the term implicit market. 
Symbolically, these relations may be shown as follows 
Let: 
e = total expenditures on air pollution abatement, by state 
government and private industry, 
e = total expenditures on air pollution abatement by state 
governments, 
e^ = total expenditures on air pollution abatement by private 
industry. 
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Starting with the obvious: 
4.01 e = e +6^. 
g i 
The quantity of air pollution abatement by each state is Q^. The 
per unit cost or implicit price facing the firm is The price facing 
the government is The aggregate per unit cost is P^ and can be 
shown to be: 
4.02 P = P + P . 
a ai ag 
Transboundary Effects 
Transboundary effects refer to the fact that air pollution and the 
impact of air pollution abatement cross political boundaries, in this 
case, from one state to another. 
In physical terms, air pollution can be generated in one state and 
not affect that state's residents because it is exported across state 
lines. Air pollution that does affect state residents is also exported 
but this is already figured into the generating state's demand for clean 
air calculus. Likewise, the polluting state Itself may be receiving 
unwanted imports of air pollution from other states. 
In monetary terms, if the instate emitter industries are abating air 
pollution, then the cost of this abatement is factored into the price of 
their goods. From the consumer's viewpoint, the cost increases of 
emitter goods due to air pollution abatement can be considered a 
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consumption tax. Therefore, to the degree that a state exports its 
emitter goods, it can shift part of the burden of paying for air 
pollution abatement to other states or countries. 
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CHAPTER V. AIR POLLUTION ABATEMENT EXPENDITURES 
To develop a model that allows for transboundary effects the expen­
diture side should be (1), distinguished from the financing of those 
expenditures and (2), broken down in sufficiently fine detail to expose 
the transboundary components and their relationship to aggregate expendi­
tures. It should be noted that the actual expenditure data have all 
these cross-state line considerations embedded in it. As before, the 
total expenditure (e) for air pollution abatement within a state 
comprises two parts: state government expenditure (e^) and private 
industry expenditure (e^). 
State Government Expenditures 
State government expenditures are hypothesized to comprise two 
parts : 
(1) The cost of state governmental monitoring, inspection, enforce­
ment and administration necessary to control the load of air pollution 
generated within the state. 
(2) The cost of additional air pollution arriving across state 
lines. This may cause negotiation/litigation costs with those states 
exporting to this state and/or may cause the state to require additional 
abatement by in-state emitter industries to help offset the effects of 
the imported air pollution. 
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To develop a mathematical model of these expenditures, consider the 
following: 
Let : 
Q : actual abated emissions in the state, 
a 
Wg! the level of abatement needed to handle the instate generated 
air pollution. 
For any state, a given amount of air pollution is "abated" by 
sending it across state lines. Conversely, the air pollution load 
in-state is increased by pollutants coming in from other states. The sum 
of these two effects is captured by the parameter u: 
5.01 
If, for example, y > 1, then Imports of pollution exceed exports. It 
is assumed that additions to the air pollution load of a state through 
imports causes the state to enforce existing regulations more strictly or 
pass additional regulations in order to compensate for imports of air 
pollution on a one-for-one basis through increased instate abatement. 
Similarly, if exports of air pollution exceed imports, then p < 1, and 
less abatement need be undertaken instate than otherwise.^ Therefore, 
the actual abatement of air pollution in a state incorporates these 
import/export factors and is shown by 
5.02 
^See Appendix A for numerical example. 
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Total state expenditures are simply 
= «g ° • ••ag (• "a)"-
Private Industry Expenditures 
The private industry expenditures for air pollution abatement are 
hypothesized to comprise the per unit cost to private industry for 
abatement ) times the quantity of air pollution emissions abated 
(Qa)= 
5.04 e. = P . • Q . 
i ai a 
Total Expenditures 
Putting the two relevant expenditure equations together, that for 
state government (equation 5.03), and that for private industry (equation 
5.04), gives total expenditures: 
5.05 e - Gg + S; . q,)" + q,. 
The expenditures side then is fairly straightforward and provides 
the baseline for the financing side which is the key to any estimable 
model of demand. 
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CHAPTER VI. FINANCING AIR POLLUTION ABATEMENT EXPENDITURES 
The financing of air pollution abatement expenditures is crucial to 
the modelling of demand in the later theoretical model chapters. 
Background and Assumptions 
How do the state governments and private industry finance these 
expenditures for air pollution statement? 
The state governments finance air pollution abatement expenditures 
out of general revenue. These funds are raised primarily through propor­
tional Income taxes and general sales taxes. To finance the necessary 
administration, monitoring and enforcement tasks of the state in air 
pollution abatement, one could think of imposing higher Income and/or 
sales tax rates, assuming that the needed funds are not diverted from 
other state programs or procured through federal grants. At the level of 
income being considered here, that of the median voter, the Impact or 
incidence of the two different types of taxes is about the same. This is 
important for modelling purposes as several states do not have state 
income taxes, some have only sales taxes while others have both state 
income and sales taxes. As more states have income taxes than not, it is 
assumed in this study that states' finance air pollution abatement with 
higher income tax rates. Those states without state income taxes are 
assumed to make changes in their sale taxes such that the effects (on the 
median voter) are the same as if additional income taxes are imposed. 
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Most of private industry, in producing its output of goods, also 
produces air pollution. Those industries producing emissions are called 
emitter industries. Likewise, those goods produced by emitter industries 
are called emitter goods. In this study, emitter industries are assumed 
to add the cost of abatement to the price of their products to cover the 
cost of air pollution abatement. This price increase due to the cost of 
abatement could be considered a "consumption tax" in that the consumers 
are being forced to pay some share (depending on the elasticities of 
demand for and supply of the emitter goods) of the cost of air pollution 
abatement by the emitter industries. If the demand for emitter goods is 
perfectly inelastic, then the consumers will pay the entire amount of the 
air pollution abatement-caused cost increase or consumption tax. If 
demand is not completely inelastic, but less than perfectly elastic, then 
the elasticities of the demand for and supply of emitter goods determine 
the cost shares of the consumption tax allocated to consumers and emitter 
goods producers. If demand is completely elastic, then the producers 
must absorb the entire cost increase. 
State residents, for the purposes of this study are assumed to be 
all consumer-taxpayer-voters (CTVs). They realize that any additional 
air pollution abatement, requested through the political process will be 
paid, at least in part, by them and that part of this payment will be 
through higher prices for emitter goods (air pollution abatement-caused 
goods prices increases) and part through higher taxes (higher income tax 
rates). 
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State Government Financing 
The state government, Ignoring intergovernmental transfers, finances 
the cost of abatement administration, monitoring and enforcement through 
taxes on state CTVs. There is no way the CTVs can shift this part of the 
cost of air pollution abatement to out-of-state residents. Therefore, 
state CTVs finance e worth of abatement activities, helping to abate Q 
® a 
tons at a per unit equilibrium price of This is summarized in 
equation 5.03 and shown here as 
"a • v "J"-
Private Industry Financing 
Consider the financing of private industry expenditures for instate 
air pollution abatement by consumers of emitter goods. These include 
both in-state and out-of-state categories and are hypothesized to 
comprise three parts: 
(1) The total amount of consumption tax paid by in-state residents 
through consumption of in-state produced emitter goods. 
(2) The total amount of consumption tax paid by out-of-state 
residents through consumption of in-state produced emitter goods. 
(3) The total amount of consumption tax paid by in-state emitter 
industries when consumer demand for emitter goods is other than perfectly 
Inelastic. 
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Putting these parts together in mathematical form: 
Let: 
Pai • Qa^' the amount of air pollution abatement costs paid by all 
consumers of in-state produced emitter goods. 
Qg: amount of air pollution abatement "charged" to all 
consumers of emitter goods. When v = 1, demand for 
emitter goods is perfectly inelastic and consumers pay all 
the mark-up or consumption tax. When 0 < v < 1, the cost 
is shared. When v = 0, emitter industries pay the entire 
tax (demand for emitter goods is perfectly elastic). 
'^ai* Psr unit cost of abatement by private industry 
ijj Pgj^ Qg: portion of consumer paid abatement cost paid by in-state 
consumers. 
i|;: percentage of in-state produced emitter goods consumed 
in-state. 
(l - 'I') Pgj^ Qg : portion of consumer paid abatement cost paid by 
out-of-state consumers. 
Pai (QQ - Qg): the consumption tax paid by state emitter industries. 
Qg is abated emissions, are those emissions 
"charged" to all consumers thus are those 
emissions "charged" to in-state emitter industries. 
Therefore, the in-state financed portion of in-state air pollution 
abatement paid through consumption taxes is 
6.02 < + fai ("a " 
Total Air Pollution Abatement Financing 
Aggregate air pollution abatement financing is undertaken by state 
governments (6.01) and consumers plus industry (6.02). This is shown by 
6.03 eg + qJ" + • P,, 0, + K " 
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The in-state financing aggregate equation 6.03 more complex than the 
expenditure aggregate 5.05 because of the cost sharing of the consumption 
tax between in-state consumers and instate emitter goods producers. 
There are two cases of interest. 
Case 1 
The assumptions for Case 1 are the most restrictive: 
(a) that in-state consumers purchase all in-state produced emitter 
goods (hence il» = 1), 
(b) that all abatement is in response to instate emissions (hence 
= 1) which implies that imports of air pollution equal 
exports (y = 1), 
(c) that the demand for emitter goods is perfectly inelastic 
( V = 1). 
As a result of these assumptions, the financing aggregate equation 
6.03 collapses to the expenditure identity: 
6.04 e = e + e. ^ = e +e. = P 0 + P.Q. 
g it g i ag a ai a 
Case 2 
Case 2 allows out-of-state purchases of in-state emitter goods (i); 
i' 1), abatement in response to nonzero net exports (i|/ 1, 
y 5^ 1), but maintains the assumption of perfectly inelastic demand for 
emitter goods (v = 1). As a result, the financing aggregate equation 
6,03 becomes 
6.05 «G + (• QJ" + • Q,. 
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Recall 5,02; Q^) and substitute into 6.05 which yields 
6.06 eg + (• QJ" + • (• QJ". 
To get 6.06 in terms of aggregate air pollution abatement per unit 
cost or implicit price P , recall 4.02: P = P + P . For each state, 
^ a a ai ag 
define some k such that 
6.07 k P = P ,, 
a ai 
6.08 (1 - k) P = P . 
a ag 
Substitute 6.07 and 6.08 into 6.06 and let; 
6.09 Z = [k + (l - k) *], 
then 
6.10 eg + S;; . Z P, q/. 
Equation 6.10 represents the financing of air pollution abatement 
from the point of view of the state's CTVs, accounting for transboundary 
costs and benefits. When a budget constraint is formulated for the 
median voter In later sections, 6.10 will prove to be an integral part. 
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CHAPTER VII. THEORETICAL MODEL 
The model has two sides to it, a demand side and a marginal cost 
side. 
Demand Side 
The demand for air pollution abatement is being modeled by using what 
is called the median voter approach. As explained by Holcombe (22, p. 
261,) median voter models all have a common starting point. 
A single political issue is to be determined by a simple 
majority voting rule, via some election process. The alterna­
tives may all be ranked along a single-dimensioned continuum, 
and all voters have single peaked preferences. 
It can be shown that the median voter will dominate by combining with one 
of the other majorities-less-one. Downs (12) suggested that the two-
party system provides an opportunity and incentive for politicans to 
shape their platforms to match the preferences of the median voter. The 
assumption used here is that the state's expenditures for monitoring and 
enforcing air pollution standards are a direct reflection of the platform 
of the political party in power. That platform reflects the preferences 
for air quality of the median voter. By making these assumptions, it 
greatly simplifies the problem of determining demand. Instead of having 
to aggregate all individuals' demands, each one necessarily having been 
previously disclosed through some demand revealing process (such as 
surveys), a utility function for the median voter can be assumed and 
ordinary demand functions derived from it. 
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Utility function 
The following utility function is specified for the median voter and 
maximized subject to his/her budget constraint. This process will 
produce ordinary (Marshallian) demand curves. 
Consider a strongly separable, linearly homogeneous utility function 
such as the venerable Cobb-Douglas: 
7.01 U = a C^ 
m 
where 
U^: utility of the median voter, 
a: some constant. 
C: composite consumption good, 
G; composite of all public goods other than air pollution 
abatement, 
Q: air pollution abatement. Air pollution abatement is dealt 
with in the expenditure and financing chapters in terms of 
Qg - where is the quantity of air pollution abatement and p 
is the "net exports" parameter. Smaller values of ji ( n < 1) 
indicate exports exceed Imports of air pollution, hence the 
amount of Q actually paid for is less than achieved. 
Therefore, will be Incorporated into the utility function 
to the power 1/u, so that values of u less than one raise the 
impact of a given level of air pollution abatement. For 
consistency of notation, raised to the 1/u will be 
incorporated in the utility function in the following manner: 
I 1 
7.03 Q = (Q^)" = 




Continuing with parameter and definitions: 
Ç, 5, y: distribution parameters 
In addition, 
7.05 Y = ATT" E\ 
with 
ATTg: median voters ideological attitude about air quality. ATT^ is 
an index with a possible range from zero to 100, with low 
values indicating no preference or even hostility towards air 
quality and higher values indicating stronger preferences for 
air quality. See Chapter VII, Data Definitions and Sources, 
for the series used. The index is monotonically scaled so 
that all values lie in the range zero to two. Thus the index, 
which appears in the utility function exponentially, can be 
given concrete meaning: 
ATTg = 1.0 connotes an median preference, 
ATT^ < 1 indicates a weaker than median preference for air 
quality, 
ATTg > 1 indicates a stronger than median preference for air 
quality. 
a: activism parameter. This gages the intensity with which the 
attitudes about air quality are held. Intensely held feelings 
are often translated into attempts to influence decision 
makers, whereas weakly held feelings results in less 
influence: 
a = 1 indicates a median level of activism, 
a > 1 indicates a greater than median level of activism, 
a < 1 indicates a less than median level of activism. 
E^: stock of air pollution existing in the state. 
E: point source instate emissions in the previous year 
y: net exports parameter. The stock of pollutants is 
increased or decreased depending on whether the state is 
a net importer or exporter of air pollution. 
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Multiply the stock of air pollution by 
7.06 SQMI^ 
SQMl'^ 
where SQMI is state area in square miles, thus giving 
7.07 
ATT" SQMI^ 
a Y = 
SQMI^ 
Let 
7.08 (E/SM) = , thus 
SQMI^ 
7.09 Y = ATT^ (E/SM)^ SOMI^. 
Budget constraint 
The median voter will pay for this abatement of air pollution 
through taxes and through higher prices for goods produced by those 
industries that emit air pollutants. The sum of abatement income taxes 
and higher emitter goods prices constitutes the air pollution abatement 
portion of the budget constraint. 
Taxes Consider the payment for abatement through taxes. Part of 
the following development follows that of Lovell (28). Assume that the 
air pollution abatement tax is a proportional income tax, then the 
average taxpayer pays: 
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7.10 T = t ' Y, 
where 
T; taxes paid by average voter for air pollution abatement, 
t: air pollution abatement tax rate, 
Y : income of the average voter (assumed to be average Income), 
The cost of abating emissions that can be ascribed to the state 
government is, recalling equation 6.01: 
'•"1 • "ag "a - '.g (• "a' 
u 
The average taxpayer's share of this expenditure is calculated by 
dividing the total expenditure by the number of CTVs which is N: 
.... 
Setting equal the abatement tax paid by the average taxpayer (7.i") 
and the average taxpayer's cost share of abating emissions (7.11) and 
solving for the air pollution abatement tax rate t gives; 
7.12 t = 
YN 
The air pollution abatement taxes paid by the median voter (T^) are 
based on the air pollution tax rate (t) and median voter income (assumed 
to be median income Y ). 
m 
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7.13 T = f Y . 
m m 
Substituting in the tax rate (7.12) into 7.13 yields; 
Pag Qa)* 
7.14 T = — • Y . 
™ YN " 
Rearranging terms gives the tax price for air pollution abatement 
for the median voter: 
Higher prices for emitter goods Now consider the payment for 
abatement through increased prices for emitter industry produced goods. 
Recall from Chapter VI, equation 6.02, the financing of air pollution 
abatement through the consumption of emitter goods: 
6.02 E_ = I P . 0% P . (0„ - 0^) it ai a ai 
Following Case 2 as developed in Chapter VI, assume that the demand 
for emitter goods is perfectly inelastic and thus consumers pay the 
entire amount of the cost increase in emitter goods due to air pollution 
abatement. In terms of 6.02 above, inelastic demand is represented when 
val, and recalling 5.02: ^a^^ and yields 
7-16 = i Pal (* "a)'-
Now e^^ represents the amount of air pollution abatement-caused 
emitter goods price increases paid by state CTVs. 
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To determine the share of cost/price increases that is paid by the 
median voter, let 
: total consumption of in-state produced emitter goods by all 
CTVs in the state, 
C^: total consumption of in-state produced emitter goods by the 
median voter, 
Q 
^ : the median voters percentage consumption of in-state emitter 
goods. 
The portion of the total abatement cost of in-state emitter goods 
passed on to the median voter is; 
\ ^  • ''ai (•"a'"-
But total consumption of emitter goods, , is the number of CTVs, 
N, times average consumption C. 
7.18 = CN 
Making the appropriate substitution of 7.18 into 7.17 gives 
C 
7.19 2% = ^ Pai Qg) ' 
m CN ai a 
It is hypothesized that the median income individual and the mean 
income individual will spend similar proportions of their incomes on 
emitter goods. Let this proportion of income spent on emitter goods be 
6, so that 
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7.20 C = 6Y , 
m m 
7.21 C = 6Y. 
Substituting in 7.20 and 7.21 into 7.19 eliminates the consumption 
terms and the 6's cancel: 
which is cost to the median voter of air pollution abatement through 
increased emitter good prices/consumption tax. 
Taxes plus higher prices for emitter goods Combining the two 
means of paying for air pollution abatement; through taxes and 
through increased prices for emitters goods (E ) yields the budget 
m 
constraint for air pollution abatement [APA^): 
7.23 APA = T + E . 
m m m 
Substituting in 7.23 for taxes with 7.15 and for higher prices with 
7.22, rearranging and factoring gives: 
Y 0*^ 
7.24 APA^ - ^  ^ 
Recall the development of the relationship between F , P , P , 
a ai ag 
specifically equations 6.07-6.09, which, when incorporated into 7.24 
yields : 
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Y P 0^ 
7.25 APA = z • — • -2—2. 
Y N 
By definition in this study, gross personal income Y is equal to 
average personal income Y, times the number of CTVs N. Substituting in 
for Y yields 
Y 
7.26 APA = Z ' P 0^. 
m Y a a 
Let: 
Y 
7.27 P' = Z • ^  • P , therefore 
a Y a 
7.28 APA = P' Q^. 
m a a 
The complete budget constraint for the median voter Based on the 
utility function described earlier, the median voter's budget constraint 
would be as follows; 
7.29 Y = PC + PG + P'O^. 
m c g a a 
Maximization 
Maximizing the median voter's utility function (7.04) subject to 
his/her budget constraint (7.29) begins with forming the lagrangian 
1 
—2 
7.30 L = a 1^ + AIY - P C - P G - P' 0^1. 
a^ J m c g a a 
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Let : 
7.31 Ti = — . 
Substituting 7.31 in 7.30 gives 
7.32 L = a (O^L^ + X[Y - P C - P G - P' 0^1. 
^ a '•m c g a a 
By assumption of linear homogeneity: 
7.33 Ç + Ç + Ti = 1. 
The first order conditions are calculated by differentiating the 




3C G + 
3L _ 
3G G ^ 




The first order conditions are solved simultaneously to get the 
demand functions in C and G in terms of 0^ and P': 
a a 
u 
7-37 C . Q*, 
c 
ÇP' 
7-38 « - liT "a-
g 
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To get the demand function for , substitute 7.37 and 7.38 into the 
budget constraint: 
7-39 \ ' 'c «a ] + "a 1 + K 
Cancelling the P^'s and P^'s and factoring out 0^ out of each of 
the terms yields: 
7.40 Y = P* [- + - + 1 1. 
m a a '•ri ri 
Substituting n / n  for 1  and putting the term in brackets over a 
common denominator gives 
\ 
Impose the constraint of linear homogeneity on the demand function 
with equation 7.33: Ç + Ç + T I=1. 
Substituting 7.33 into 7.41 results in 
P' 
7 - 4 2  
Recall that 7.31: n = -jjJ, 7.27: P^ = Z • Y~ * Pg and 7.09: 
Y = ATT" (E/SM)^  SQMI^ . Substituting these in 7.38, cancelling and 
solving for 0^ gives: 
7.43 0^ = ^ 
Y ATT" (E/SM)*^ SOMI'^ 
® Z pZ p 
a 
Divide both sides by SQMI^ and letting 
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7.44 
brings in the concentration factor. For instance, a given level of 
abatement will have more of an impact in a smaller state than in a larger 
one, just as removing one cigar smoker from a phone booth will have more 
impact on the given environemnt's air quality than removing a cigar 
smoker from an auditorium will. 7.43 can now be written as 
7.45 
Y ATT* (E/SM)^ 
Taking logs of both sides of 7.45 yields: 
7.46 U In 0 = -21n JJ - In + In Y + a In ATT 
a 
+ y In E/SM - In Z 
Dividing through by y results in: 
7.47 InQ = - — In M - "7 InP + InY + — InATT U  y a w  y  a  





*3 = 7' 
39 
Substituting in the above results in 
7.48 In Q = a - a In P + a In Y 
u i a ^ 
+ a. In ATT + ct, In E/SM - a_ In Z. j 3 4 J 
Equation 7.48 is an estimable demand function that includes many 
common sense variables but has been derived from economic theory. There 
are no data for Z, hence in the estimation process, the variable Z would 
have to be dropped. The consequences for omitting a variable that is 
thought to belong in a regression equation is discussed in Chapter IX 
Estimation, Results and Conclusions. 
Marginal Cost Side 
The supply of air pollution abatement is produced through joint 
production. Instead of two products-one firm case as is normally thought 
of, the production of clean air (a single good) is undertaken by two 
divisions of a figurative single joint product firm. This "joint" pro­
duction function involves the state government as one division through 
their monitoring and enforcement of air pollution abatement regulations 
and it involves private industry as the other division. Private industry 
responds to government regulations and enforcement by capital investment 
In air pollution abatement equipment (APAE) and current operating expen­
diture on existing APAE. The primary Inputs to this production process 
are hypothesized to be labor and capital. The state governments provide 
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only labor through their bureaucracy for monitoring, enforcement, 
administration, and R&D. Private industry provides both labor and 
capital for the actual technological reduction/prevention of a certain 
amount of emissions. If the entire joint process can be considered to be 
efficient (least cost) then cost minimization, subject to output 
constraints, can yield marginal cost (MC) functions, the inverse of which 
are supply functions. 
Downing's model (11) shows that part of control agency's budget is 
spent not on providing environmental quality but rather on discretionary 
activities. Maximizing this discretionary part of the budget is seen as 
one of the bureaucrats goals - thus the marginal cost of implementation 
curve (MCI) which accounts for discretionary activities lies inside the 
efficient MCI. It is this inner curve on which points can be observed. 
It is postulated here that the portion of the budget used for environ­
mental, rather than discretionary activities, is used efficiently. 
Consider the following homogenous form of the production function: 
7.49 Qg = 
where 
Q„ : tons of abated emissions. 
a 
E; point emissions in the previous year. This is a measure of 
the stock of industrial air pollution. This stock greatly 
influences the degree of difficulty in achieving abatement. 
In very dirty areas marginal abatement will be relatively 
inexpensive and conversely in very clean areas with extensive 
ongoing abatement. 
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L : labor input bv the state government, 
g 
: labor input by emitter industries, 
K: capital stock of APAE employed by emitter industries in the 
current period, 
ir, (p: distribution parameters, 
a: efficiency parameter, 0 < o < 1. When a = 1, discretionary 
activities are zero and the entire control agency budget is 
used for air quality control. If a < 1, then there is that 
degree of discretionary activity. 
The government air pollution control agency cannot minimize cost 
with respect L°, the effective labor input but must fund the full labor 
complement and minimize costs with respect to that total labor input. 
This is because although a given percentage of labor input is used for 
discretionary nonabatement activities, this may come as a percentage of 
otherwise efficient employee time rather than having employees divided 
into full time discretionary or nondiscretionary groups. The following 
lagranglan is then formed to minimize costs subject to an output 
constraint: 
7.50 C = w L + w, L, + r K + X[0 - E K*], g g il *• a g 1 
where 
w ; wage rate of state government workers engaged in abatement 
activities, 
w^: wage rate of emitter industry workers engaged in abatement 
activities, 
r; user cost of capital, 
X; lagranglan multiplier. 
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In forming this lagrangian, it can be shown (25, p. 214) that the 
lagrangian multiplier (») is marginal cost (MC). The first order 
conditions are determined by differentiating the lagrangian 7.50 with 
respect to the choice variables L , L , K and the multiplier X: 
-op '0^ X a p 0 
7.51 \ -75-1 - — • 
8C . ,r"" '"a, „ , * " "a 
7.52 "Il " "i -] = 0; = Wj ' Ï 1 
- ( | )  '0 X (j) 0 
K = 7.53 = r + A[ ^—-] = 0; 
7.54 — = Q - E L L* K* = 0. 
=  S  1  
Substituting each of the first order conditions involving the choice 
variables into the budget constraint 7.54 yields; 
X a p O  X n O  ^  X ( j ) Q  
= (J(^). 
g 1 
Put emissions E on a per square mile basis to take into account the 
concentration of emissions 
_  X a p O  X t r O  ^  X  ( | )  Q  
°a = • SŒ • 
Divide through by square miles, SQMI, thus taking the concentration 
factor into account on the abatement side. 
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Let 
0=0 /SOMI and 
a 
E/SM = E/SOMI then 
X a p O  X T T O  ^  X  (|) 0 
7.57 0 = (E/SM) (— -) ' 
g i 
Solving for X and letting 
7.58 in=ap+ïï+(|), and 
7.59 s = (a gives 
l-m op Jl jt 
0 ° w * w, * r* 
7.60 X = ^—P 
(E/SM)" s" 
Assuming that this joint firm behaves as if it were a perfect 
competitor, that is, sets price equal to marginal cost then: 
7.61 = MC = X. 
Substituting in P for X and taking logs of both sides gives: 
7.62 In p"^ = - — In s + ^ In 0 + — In w + — In w. 
m m m g m i 





^4 = m' 
% = & 
Substituting these into 7.62 gives 
7.63 In = 6Q + 3j^ In 0 - ^2 Wg ~ In 
- 3^ In r - In E/SM. 
Equation 7.63 is the marginal cost function. 
Once all the coefficients have been estimated, then some of the 
parameters can be determined using the coefficient estimates. It can be 
shown^ that the relationships between the parameters and the model 
coefficients are: 
7.64 . = '2''' 
^2^3 ^2^4 ^3^4 "^ ^ 2 ^3 ^ 4' 
^See Appendix B for solution of distribution and efficiency 
parameters in terms of the coefficients. 
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° :2«3 + *2"4 + 83»4 + »2«3»4' 
The parameter of most interest would be the efficiency parameter a. 
Unfortunately, there are an insufficient number of independent equations 
to solve for or, only the product cp can be determined. Several 
elasticities would also be available: price elasticity with respect to 
abatement, the elasticity of price of abatement with respect to wage 
rates, the elasticity of abatement price with respect to the user cost of 
capital, and the price of elasticity with respect to the existing stock 
of air pollution. 
The Complete Model 
The complete model brings together the demand side and the marginal 
cost of abatement. The supply and demand decisions are assumed to be 
made at the same time, thus simultaneous equations techniques are called 
for. The model consists of a demand equation, a marginal cost equation 
and an equilibrium condition linking the two: 
7.66 Demand : In 0^ = Og - In In Y + In ATT^ 
+ In E/SM - oy In Z 
7.67 Marginal Cost: In In - Pg In w^ + 3^ 
+ In r - gg In E/SM 
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7.68 Equilibrium Condition: In = In 
The unit of observation is the state thus the estimation will be 
cross-sectional analysis. Data from 1974 through 1978 will be pooled 
form the sample. Simultaneous regression technqiues such as two and 
three stage leasts squares will be used to analyze the data. 
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CHAPTER VIII. DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
The critical data necessary for the empirical estimation of the 
model are air pollution abatement by state and private industry and state 
government expenditures on air pollution abatement. These data are 
necessary to calculate the implicit per unit cost or price of air 
pollution abatement. 
The sample period is 1974-1978. This was chosen for two reasons. 
First, the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970 in which national air 
quality standards were set and the individual states were charged with 
monitoring and enforcing these standards, meant that both states and 
private industry would be attempting to reach during the middle 1970s 
some equilibrium level of spending supportable by the CTVs. Second, the 
availability of data given the model construction. Consistent data 
series on air pollution abatement expenditures do not start until 1972-3; 
the same being true for quantities of air pollutants abated. The year 
1974 was the most feasible starting date. The data for quantities abated 
are consistent for the years 1974-76, then in 1977 and 1978 changes were 
made. In 1977, estimates of air pollution abatement were derived from a 
sample consisting of firms with 20 or more employees instead of all 
firms. In 1978, there were additional changes, in that data entries with 
standard errors larger than 20 percent were not reported. The 
expenditure data were consistent throughout the sample period but not 
beyond. To extend the sample period beyond 1978 proved to be Impractical 
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for this study. Data (such as value-added by standard industrial 
classification code by state) necessary for the construction of air 
pollution abatement data series were not available and therefore the 
consistency of the series would be at risk if extended over a longer 
period. Abatement expenditure data are similarly affected. 
One quirk in the data must be mentioned. Major industry Group 23, 
Apparel and Other Textile Products was not included in any of the Bureau 
of Census abatement quantity or expenditure surveys and therefore is 
excluded from the state totals. 
The variables are defined below by equation; first, demand for air 
pollution abatement, then the marginal cost of air pollution abatement. 
Demand for Air Pollution Abatement 
The demand equation is 
In Q = otg - In P + In Y + In ATT^ + In E/SM 
- In Z, 
where 
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Qg; tons of air pollution emissions abated in each state. 
These are aggregate emissions abated, the sum of 
particulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, 
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, heavy metals, toxic and 
nuclear air pollutants. 
SQMI: state area in square miles. 
Data on air pollution abatement are available (42) by pollutant, state 
and standard industry classification (SIC) code. However, many state-
pollutant-SIC data positions were omitted, generally to preserve confi­
dentiality of an industry or a particular firm. To overcome this 
problem, the ratio of emissions abated to value-added (40) was calcu­
lated, where data were available, for each pollutant class, state and SIC 
code. For each pollutant class, these ratios were summed over all states 
within each SIC code and then divided by the number of nonzero ratios in 
each code. That is, the average emissions abated per dollar of value-
added was calculated for each SIC code for every class of pollutants. 
The classes of pollutants are (1) particulates, (2) sulfur oxides, (3) 
nitrogen oxides + hydrocarbons + carbon monoxide, and (4) heavy metals + 
toxic + nuclear. 
The original census abatement data matrices (50 states by 19 SIC 
codes for four classes of pollutants) were then examined for zero abate­
ment entries. Upon discovering a zero abatement level for a pollutant-
state-SIC data position, the average (over all states) emissions abated 
per dollar of value-added ratio for that SIC code and pollutant was 
multiplied by the value-added in that SIC code in that state, thus 
generating an "average" level of abatement for the state, SIC code and 
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pollutant data position. This average level was substituted for the zero 
value. If the state had little or no value added in a particular SIC 
classification, it generally would not have much emissions nor abatement 
from that SIC code. Therefore, there is little chance of this estimation 
procedure providing estimates of nonexistent abatement. 
After the original census abatement data matrices have been "filled-
in" with estimates for the omitted values, then for each pollutant the 
total amount abated for each state is calculated by summing over all SIC 
codes. The state totals of abatement by pollutant are themselves summed 
over pollutants to give an aggregate total of air pollution abatement by 
state. This aggregate total of abatement is used for 0^ - the tons of 
air pollution abatement in each state. 
This procedure was used for years 1974-1977. For 1978, the number 
of SIC abatement entries for each state was reduced by the Bureau of 
Census by one-half or in many cases, much more. The procedure used for 
1974-77 could not be used, thus the tabular totals were used instead. 
Further, in the few states where abatement totals (as listed) dropped by 
50% or more in 1978, totals for 1977 were substituted. 
Data on state area are readily available. One source is the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (46), 
P: per unit cost or price of abating one ton of air pollutant 
per square mile. 
Data on per unit costs are not available so P is an implicit price, 
determined by using the expenditure identity: expenditures equals price 
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times quantity. The expenditures on air pollution abatement is the sum 
of expenditure by state government (41) and by private industry (42). 
There are several categories of expenditure by both government and 
private industry, but only selected categories are used. On the govern­
ment side, capital investment and intergovernmental grants were ignored. 
Investment is extremely lumpy, for example in one year one state made 90% 
of the capital investment. Intergovernmental transfers were not used for 
similar reasons and for the fact that they are not locally originating, 
hence are not reflective of demand. What remains is current operating 
expenditure which is taken to be largely labor input. On the private 
industry side, both categories, current operating expenditure and 
investment were included, although investment was lagged one year. All 
these categories were summed to give total expenditure on air pollution 
abatement. The per unit cost was then calculated as total expenditure on 
abatement divided by total abatement per square mile. 
Y : gross personal income. 
Data for gross personal income are readily available. This 
particular series, State Personal Income was found in the Survey of 
Current Business (48). 
ATT^; attitudes of state CTVs environmental quality lagged one year. 
The lag is necessary as spending in the current year is 
decided in the previous year, hence it is attitudes in the 
past year that influence current spending levels. This is 
proxied by the votes of the state congressional delegation on 
environmental issues. An index is constructed, 0 to 100, with 
higher values indicating greater pro-environmental stance. 
This index is scaled to fall within limits 0 to 2 to conform 
with the model. 
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The League of Conservation Voters (26) provides a scorecard for the 
U.S. Congress on environmental issues. Each year since 1971, the House 
of Representatives has been graded, member by member, by the League on 
environmental issues. Thus, a delegation environmental average score can 
be determined and this is held to be reflective of a state's CTVs 
attitudes about air quality. 
E/SM; Total point emissions of air pollutants per square mile for 
the previous year 
Data on emissions by air pollutant by state by year are available 
(51). Data for the year 1976 were unavailable and thus the average of 
1977 and 1975 was used. 
A mixed term; Z = [k+ (l-k)<|/], 
where 
i|;: percentage that instate generated air pollution abatement 
requirement is of actual abatement. 
i|i: percentage of instate produced emitter goods consumed instate, 
k: the percentage of total expenditures on abatement that is 
state government expenditures. 
Of all the variables in the mixed term, only k is known. Hence, 
this term cannot be used in the regression analysis. For the conse­
quences of omitting a variable from a correctly specified regression 
equation, see the discussion in Chapter IX, Estimation, Results and 
Conclusions. 
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Marginal Cost of Air Pollution Abatement 
The marginal cost equation is : 
In 0 = 3Q + In P - $2 - 3  ^ In W^- In r 
+ gg In E/SM, 
where 
Q: defined previously under Demand for Air Quality, 
P; defined previously under Demand for Air Quality. 
E/SM; defined previously under Demand for Air Quality. 
w„: wage rates of state government employees engaged in air 
pollution abatement activities. 
Ther<î are published data (43) on state governmental payrolls and 
employment by function. Air quality control is not separately identified 
as a function therefore the "general control" category was selected. By 
dividing the monthly payroll for "general control" by the number of full 
time equivalent employees in that category a monthly wage is calculated. 
w^: wage rates of private Industry employees engaged in air 
pollution abatement activities. 
There are published data (40) on SIC payroll and employment for produc­
tion workers in each state. For each SIC Industry in each state, payroll 
is divided by employment to yield a monthly wage rate. Then for each 
state the percentage of total abatement by each SIC code (42) is 
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multiplied by the wage rate in that SIC code. These weighted wage rates 
are summed to get a weighted average wage rate for private industry 
abatement workers in the state. 
r: user cost of capital 
Capital in this model is all purchased capital so that r represents 
the user cost of owning and employing capital goods rather than just a 
flow of capital services as would be the case if the capital goods \rere 
leased. User cost of capital consists of three parts; (a) the opportu­
nity cost, (b) depreciation, (c) appreciation. See (Branson (7), p. 
230ff) for details. These are proxied as follows: The opportunity cost 
by the prime rate (13) times the cost of the air pollution abatement 
equipment (APAE) ordered. There are data on number of units of APAE 
shippped and value of shipment (44) for particulate and gaseous 
abatement. The price of the new capital is determined by dividing value 
of shipments by units shipped for each type of particulate and gaseous 
abatement equipment. The price for each type is then weighted by the 
percentage by that type of total value shipped under each class (particu­
late, gaseous). All types under each class are then summed to give a 
weighted price for particulate equipment purchases and a weighted price 
for gaseous equipment purchases. These two prices are then weighted by 
percentage that each class is of the sum of abatement of the two classes 
(42). The price of new air pollution abatement consists of the sum of 
the weighted prices for particulate and gaseous abatement equipment for 
each state. Depreciation is calculated as an arbitrary 10 percent of the 
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new cost of air pollution abatement equipment. Appreciation was 
calculated from an index of new plant and equipment prices (38) times the 
cost of new abatement equipment. 
All these data series were collected for all 50 states for the years 
1974-78, with the exception of investment attitudes, and emissions which 
were collected for 1973-77. 
Price Indexes 
The model is estimated in constant 1972 dollars. This required 
deflating all the monetary series. The following deflators were used: 
Personal Consumption Expenditures Index (47) is used to deflate 
gross personal Income. 
Wages of Manufacturing Workers Index (47) is used to deflate private 
Industry abatement workers wage rate. 
Air Pollution Abatement Plant and Equipment Index (38) Is used to 
deflate private industry investment in air pollution equipment. 
Regulation and Monitoring of Pollution Abatement Index (38) is used 
to deflate state government abatement employees wage rate. 
Pollution Abatement and Control Index (38) was used to deflate 
current operating expenditure for air pollution abatement by 
private Industry. 
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CHAPTER IX. ESTIMATION, RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A theoretical model of the demand for air pollution abatement and 
the marginal cost of supplying air pollution abatement was developed in 
Chapter VII. In the same chapter, it was shown how this model could be 
put in such a form that it could be estimated statistically. Chapter 
VIII laid out the definitions of the data, described how different series 
were constructed and gave the data sources. This chapter will describe 
the empirical model, its limitations, the econometric techniques used, 
the results obtained and what new knowledge can be drawn from this 
research. 
Estimation Model 
The model, as previously developed, consists of a demand equation of 
the median voter for air pollution abatement, a marginal cost equation 
for providing air pollution abatement and an equilibrium condition 
linking the two. For reference, the model and its variable definitions 
are listed below: 
9.01 Demand: In 0^ = otg - In + Og In Y + In ATT^ 
+ In E/SM - In Z, 
where 
air pollution abatement demanded, measured in terms of 
abatement per square miles ('000 tons/square mile), 
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P*^: implicit per unit cost or price of abatement ('000$/('000 
tons/square mile)), the price CTVs are willing to pay, 
Y: gross personal income ('000$), 
ATTg: index of ideological attitudes in the previous year about 
environmental quality, pro-environmental > anti-environmental, 
E/SM: emissions per square mile in the previous year - a measure of 
the stock of air pollution ('000 tons/square mile), 
Z: a mixed term of several variables relating to transboundary 
effects. 
9.02 Marginal Cost: =3^+3^ In 0^+ Pg 1" ^3 
+ 3^ In r - In E/SM 
where the variables not already defined are 
quanti) 
mile), 
Q^: ty of air pollution abatement supplied ('000 tons/square 
P™^: price at which abatement is supplied, 
w„: wage rate of government workers engaged in air pollution 
abatement activities ('000$/month), 
Wj, : wage rate of private industry workers engaged in air pollution 
abatement activities ('000$/month), 
r; user cost of capital ('000$). 
9.03 Equilibrium Condition: In P*^ = In P^^. 
In equilibrium, the price the CTVs are willing to pay must equal the 
marginal cost of supplying air pollution abatement. 
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Simultaneity 
This model was estimated simultaneously to capture all the interde-
pendencies between the median CTVs, the state governments and the in­
state private industry emitters. The decisions for abatement in one year 
are made largely in the previous year, when state governments act, 
through their legislature, to fund air pollution abatement oversight and 
enforcement in the coming year. At the same time, industry is deciding 
on this year's investment in air pollution abatement capital goods and 
employment levels or whether and how much to fight EPA implementation 
regulations. It is during this time that each of the involved parties 
attempts to read the other in order to produce a level of abatement 
consistent with the desires of the median voter and capabilities of 
private industry. Industry tries to influence the public in general and 
the state legislatures in particular in order to minimize the enforcement 
of existing air pollution laws and regulations. Public interest pressure 
groups plead for additional abatement and the state legislatures try to 
balance competing air pollution abatement demands. Reflecting this in 
the model, the attitudes variable, the pollution stock variable and the 
level of investment were all lagged one year. The level of investment 
does not appear explicitly but is used to calculate the implicit price of 
air pollution abatement. 
Data 
The data consist of a pooled time-series cross-section sample of the 
fifty states of the United States for the years 1974-1978. For details, 
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see Chapter VIII. All the monetary series (expenditures, wage rates, 
income) were deflated by appropriate deflators to put money data in terms 
of constant 1972 dollars. 
One limitation of this model is that a data series cannot be formed 
for Z. Z is a mixed term, an expression of several variables, for some 
of which no data exist. Therefore, Z will have to be dropped from the 
demand equation. Kmenta (23, p. 392) shows that if the omitted explana­
tory variable is uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables, 
then the estimators of the coefficients (except the intercept) will be 
unbiased, although the variance of the estimators will be biased upwards, 
leading to overly conservative tests of significance. It is assumed here 
that Z is uncorrelated with the other independent variables in the demand 
equation. If this is, in fact, an unreasonable assumption, then the 
coefficient estimates will be biased. 
Estimation Techniques 
The model was estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS) to 
avoid simultaneity bias and inconsistency. As there has been unavoidable 
misspecification of the demand equation by dropping the variable Z, 
systems techniques such as three stage least squares (3SLS) are, for the 
most part, less useful. That is because these systems estimation 
techniques are sensitive to the specification of the model. According to 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (33, p. 287): "A serious specification error in 
one equation can affect the parameter estimates in all equations of the 
model." 
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Pooling time-series and cross-section data present additional 
econometric problems. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates restrict 
the model by assuming constant slope and intercepts over time and cross-
section observations. The decision to pool the data is based on the 
belief that the structural coefficients do not change over time, but the 
assumption of constant intercepts is not necessary. One method to avoid 
the assumption of constant intercepts over time and cross-section units 
would be to use dummy variables: N-1 cross-section dummies (49) and T-1 
time-series dummies (4), for a total of 53 dummies. This approach was 
taken to some degree in the marginal cost equation. Time dummies and 
regional dummies were included in some of the estimations. The time 
dummies were never significant and are not reported. Regional dummies 
proved to be a useful addition in explaining the regional distribution of 
the costs of air pollution abatement. The demand equation was not 
estimated with either time or cross-section dummies as it was felt that 
the nature of demand makes it Inherently stable over time and cross-
section, thus the constancy of the intercept assumption seemed less 
restrictive. An extension of the dummy variable technique (covarlance 
model) is the error components model. The error components model breaks 
up the error term Into three component parts: cross-section, time-series 
and combined. The error components model treats the intercept terms as 
random variables (one time-series one cross-section) rather than as a 
group of coefficients. To apply OLS to a pooled sample is to assume, in 
terms of the error components model, that the Intercepts do not vary 
randomly. The error components model is not directly applicable to the 
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estimation of simultaneous equations. All of the above estimation 
methods provide unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates although 
with different efficiencies. In terms of efficiency, error components is 
more efficient than covariance vrtiile OLS is the least efficient of the 
three. 
Other econometric problems associated with using a pooled time-
series cross-section data sample are heteroscedasticlty and serial 
correlation. Heteroscedasticlty was not thought to be an important 
influence because many of the variables are on a per square mile basis 
thus reducing the likelihood of increasing error variance with increasing 
magnitude of the Independent variable. Nevertheless, the sample was 
sorted by gross personal income (one of the variables not on a per square 
basis) and the Goldfeld-Quandt test for the presence of heteroscedastic­
lty was performed. The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was rejected 
but only after discovering that the Mean Squared Error (MSE) was hi^er 
for low income states than for high income states. This surprising 
result was taken as an indication of "over-correction" by the use of 
variables on a square mile basis. Several transformations of the data 
were attempted in order to correct for heteroscedasticlty but none proved 
satisfactory. With heteroscedasticlty remaining, the OLS (or 2SLS) 
estimates still will be unbiased and consistent although no longer 
efficient and the estimated variances of the estimated coefficients will 
be biased (Pindyck and Rubinfeld (33), page 96). Finally, using a pooled 
time-series cross-section data sample, there is the possibility of serial 
correlation. The use of Durbin-Watson's d-statistic is not appropriate 
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to detect the presence of first-order autocorrelation in a pooled sample 
so it was not reported. The problem of serial correlation in this model 
is thought to be small given the time period chosen: 1974-1978. This 
included a severe recession then recovery, meaning that the errors would 
be unlikely to follow a simple autogressive process. No correction for 
serial correlation was made. 
Results 
The results from the estimation of the initial model are reported in 
Table 9.01. In general, the results are mixed. The demand equation 
performed particularly well with all coefficient signs as predicted by 
theory and all the coefficient estimates statistically significant at the 
10 percent level. The marginal cost equation did not do as well. The 
sign on the user cost of capital is unexpected, but the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimate for the quantity 
term was also insignificant. It should be recalled that one of the 
effects of omitting a variable is to bias the variance of the coeffi­
cients' estimators upward, reducing the magnitude of the t-statistics and 
making the statistical significance of the coefficients appear weaker 
than they really are. The coefficients on the remaining terms in the 
marginal cost function all have the anticipated signs and are 
statistically significant. 
Table 9.01. Estimation results 
Demand Equation: Q = f(Price , Y, ATT^, E/SM) 
Technique P Y ATT^ E/SM R2 
(-)* (+) (+) (+) 
2SLS -0.271 0.478 0.272 0.684 0.85 
(-3.66)b (6.53) (2.96) (12.52) 
Variable Definitions: 
P: per unit cost of abatement 
Y: gross personal income 
ATTg: ideological view of air quality, pro-environment > anti-
environment 
E/SM: stock of air pollution, emissions per square mile 
BSigns as predicted by theory. 
^T-statistics. 
'^Sign is contrary to that predicted by theory. 
*Insignificant at the 0.10 level. 
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Marginal Cost Equation: P = g(Q> Wg, w^, r, E/SM) 
0 
"g Wi r E/SM R2 
(+) (+) (+) (+) (-) 
0.191 0.927 4.007 -O.I25C -0.511 0.35 
(0.94)* (1.83) (8.06) (-1.01)* (-2.371) 
Variable Definitions: 
Q: quantity of air pollution abatement 
w : wage rate for government employees 
w^: wage rate for private industry employees engaged in air 
pollution abatement 




Demand equation coefficient estimates The price elasticity of 
demand is the coefficient estimate of -0.271. This would say that the 
demand for air pollution abatement is rather price insensitive, that air 
pollution abatement is more in the nature of a price inelastic necessity 
rather than a price elastic luxury good. There are at least two reasons 
for this price Inelasticity. One may be a permanent change in tastes and 
preferences such that very dirty air is no longer tolerated and that 
voters have come to expect and demand the abatement necessary to provide 
a sufficient level of air quality. In a sense, spending on air pollution 
abatement is not a discretionary expenditure subject to shifting 
preferences, but rather an inherent part of modern life. 
A second reason that the demand for air pollution abatement may be 
price inelastic is the magnitude and circumstances of the expenditures 
involved. The increased tax burden on the median voter due to air 
pollution monitoring and enforcement by state agencies and the price 
Increases on emitter goods is bound to be small. In 1975, California 
(state and private industry) spent roughly $14.60 per person for air 
pollution abatement, while New York spent $5.69, Iowa spent $13.44 and 
Mississippi spent $26.09. With 10 or 20 percent increase in the implicit 
price, it is not going to have that big of an impact, especially if air 
pollution abatement is an ongoing program. Even though cross-section 
studies are often thought of as giving long run results, the air 
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pollution abatement institutions and programs during this time period, 
with the possible exception of California, are immature, and therefore 
there would still be some resistance to change not found in a true long-
run demand situation. 
The second variable is gross personal income which is estimated with 
a coefficient of 0.478. This coefficient estimate is the income elastic­
ity of demand; a 10 percent increase in gross state income would 
increase the demand for abatement by nearly five percent. One would 
expect air pollution abatement to be somewhat income elastic, that is, 
the demand for abatement would increase by the same percentage (or 
greater) as does income. Income here is gross personal income not per 
capita personal income. It can be shown^, however, that the coeffi­
cient on the gross income variable should be the same as on the per 
capita income, if per capita income and population were substituted for 
gross income. Harrison and Rubinfeld (20), and Nelson (31) find Income 
elasticities (based on household, not per capita, Income) of approxi­
mately 1.0. This is a logical result in their models; higher priced 
property sites generally have better air quality, as incomes rise indi­
viduals move up to better, more expensive dwellings, where the air is 
cleaner. In the present study, as incomes rise, individuals demand more 
abatement for society in general, abatement being a normal good, but the 
increase in state-wide abatement may not hâve as dramatic an effect upon 
them as would switching neighborhoods. All neighborhoods may be somewhat 
^See Appendix C. 
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cleaner (in terms of air quality) if state-wide abatement increases but 
the relative cleanliness among neighborhoods may not change much. 
Therefore, those individuals with rising incomes and a positive 
preference for air quality will both move to a cleaner neighborhood and 
support more air pollution abatement. But the impact of increased state 
wide abatement on these individuals would be far less than switching 
neighborhoods; therefore, their demand for state wide abatement will be 
less income elastic. 
The third variable is the attitudes variable, with a coefficient of 
0.272. This attitude elasticity of demand says that a 10 percent 
positive shift in people's preferences for environmental quality will 
increase abatement almost three percent. Given the slow rate of change 
of people's preferences, this result would say that environmental 
sensitivity campaigns would have to cause dramatic shifts in attitudes 
before large increases in abatement would occur. But then in some states 
there is room for considerable percentage change. New Mexico, for 
instance, has in several years an attitude index score of 20 out of a 
possible 100, compared with Massachusetts's rating of 77. 
The final variable on the demand side is the stock of air pollution 
with a coefficient estimate of 0.684. This is more elastic than the 
other estimates as one might expect. A 10 percent increase in the stock 
of pollution would increase demand for abatement by nearly 7 percent, as 
the state's environment would probably be able to naturally assimilate 
some portion of the emissions. The size of the coefficient indicates 
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that people are aware of their environment and this awareness plays a 
significant role in their decisions about air pollution abatement. 
Demand model parameter estimates The demand model in Chapter 
VII predicted that the coefficients for price and income would be of the 
same magnitude but opposite in sign. As shown above, the coefficient 
estimates in question are -0.271 (price) and 0.478 (income). The actual 
coefficients are expressions involving parameters of the utility 
function. In this case, they are equal to -1/n (price) and 1/y (income). 
The null hypothesis + «g (="")= 0 is rejected even at the 
2% level. Because the estimates do not conform to the theoretical 
prediction, one cannot safely calculate values for p. But in both 
instances, the coefficient estimates call for values of y in excess of 
unity. Recall that y is the net exports parameter, and y > 1 means that 
on average the states are net importers of pollution. This is the 
expected result. This would mean that there are fewer exporting air 
pollution than importing, discounting international air pollution 
movements. This seems to fit the nature of this country with perhaps a 
dozen industrial states doing the net exporting to the remainder. If 
true, there would be a need for stronger federal intervention to reduce 
the flow of air pollution between states. 
Other results called for by the theoretical demand model include a 
value of unity (vi/w) for the stock of air pollution coefficient (actual 
value: 0.68). The estimated value is close to one but statistically 
different from one. Another result is the activism parameter a, 
calculated as part of the coefficient on the attitudes variable: 
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a/u = 0.27. Although the value of y is not known with certainty, its 
value was inferred to be greater than one but not so large as to make 
a 1. If so, this would imply low activism levels on the part of the 
median CTVs, a not unexpected result given the general apathy of the 
middle 1970s. 
Marginal Cost Equation 
Marginal cost equation coefficient estimates The first variable 
in the marginal cost equation is quantity of abatement. The coefficient 
is not statistically significant; thus one cannot analyze its magnitude 
without peril. But assuming that quantity does belong in the marginal 
cost equation it would seem to be safe to make some comments as if the 
actual magnitude of the estimate is in the inelastic range. If the price 
of abatement was inelastic with respect to quantity, with a 10 percent 
increase in quantity abated increasing abatement price 2-4 percent, then 
the following would be pertinent. States could increase their abatement 
requirements to get cleaner air without imposing heavy costs on either 
taxpayers or consumers. This is because the marginal cost curve would be 
fairly "flat", especially if the elasticity was around 0.2. If true, 
this would be important evidence to rebut some of the more excessive 
claims about the impending costs associated with additional abatement. 
The elasticity of the marginal cost of abatement curve with respect 
to price has important policy implications. Alt and Miranowski (1) show 
that in a world with less than perfect information the social cost of 
error from applying different policies to regulate pollution emissions 
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depends upon the elasticity of the marginal cost/supply curve of 
abatement. According to Alt and Miranowski (p. 48ff) 
If the abatement supply curve is inelastic, a price 
incentive scheme implies less potential social cost of error. 
If the abatement supply curve is elastic, setting the level of 
abatement by direct regulations or by auctioning a fixed 
quantity of pollution rights implies less potential cost of an 
error. 
An inelastic (price with respect to quantity) marginal cost curve 
means that for a large change in quantity abated, there is a small change 
in price. This is normally considered an elastic situation, as price 
elasticities are defined in terms of quantity with respect to price. 
Therefore, an inelastic marginal cost curve for abatement is the same as 
Alt and Miranowski's elastic supply curve of abatement. With inelastic 
marginal cost/elastic supply, direct regulation or auction rights are the 
policy types that provide the lowest cost of social error. Direct 
regulation is the course presently taken in air pollution abatement; 
thus, the low marginal cost/high supply function elasticity estimates 
provided by this model confirm the choice of policy in general. 
The second variable in the marginal cost equation is the wages of 
government abatement workers. The elasticity of the price of abatement 
with respect to government wages is near unity. The size of this 
elasticity is to be expected despite the fact that government expendi­
tures on air pollution abatement are a small portion of the total 
spending for air pollution abatement: in Illinois in 1974, the state 
government spent 2.5%, in Texas in 1975 the state government spent 2,1% 
and In Mississippi in 1978, the state government spent 1,7% of the total 
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Instate expenditure for air pollution abatement. One of the reasons some 
states may pay their air pollution abatement employees more than other 
states do is that their skill mix is higher. Those states with higher 
skill mixes in their air pollution abatement monitoring and enforcement 
employees are generally those states that provide higher levels of all 
government services. Some of the states paying the top government wages 
are Iowa, Michigan, Oregon, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania and 
Alaska. High levels of air pollution monitoring and abatement enforce­
ment on the part of governmont translates into higher abatement costs 
(both current expenditure and investment) for private Industry in 
the state. Thus, moving from low government wage states to high 
government wage states implies going from low cost of air pollution 
abatement to states where the costs of abatement, because of the 
Increased enforcement, are higher. 
The third variable In the marginal cost equation is the wages of the 
private Industry abatement employees. Here, the elasticity of the price 
of abatement with respect to wages Is four. Private Industry wages 
capture several characteristics. One is the industrial base of the 
state. A second is the industrial mix of the state and closely related 
to that is a third attribute, skill level of the private Industry 
workers. 
The lightly industrialized states have lower emissions of air 
pollutants, lower abatement of air pollutants and generally lower wages 
than the industrialized states. For example, in 1976 Rhode Island 
emitted 41,700 tons, abated 137,490 tons and had a monthly wage (constant 
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1972 dollars) of $434. Texas in 1976, emitted 591,580 tons, abated 
682,826 tons and had a monthly wage (constant 1972 dollars) of $663. 
Obviously Texas and Rhode Island are quite different states in terms of 
industrial base and industrial mix. The larger, more industrialized 
states emit/abate more air pollution while employing more expensive 
labor. The private industry wage differential between states in the 
cross-section sample captures these differences in size of the industrial 
base and industrial mix. 
Further, lightly industrialized, low wage states spend less on 
abatement plant and equipment. Rhode Island's private industry in 1976 
invested $622,000 in air pollution abatement and equipment. Private 
industry in Texas invested $168M during the same year. 
As a result of two factors, low labor costs (reflecting differences 
in industrial mix) and low investment requirements (due to differences in 
industrial base), Rhode Island was able to abate air pollution for $28 a 
ton while Texas paid $45 a ton. 
The private industry wage reflects not only labor costs, but differ­
ences in the size of the industrial base and industrial mix as well as 
investment in air pollution abatement capital goods. Therefore, it is 
not surprising to get a very elastic marginal cost with respect to 
private industry wage. 
The fourth variable in the marginal cost equation is that of user 
cost of capital. It performed poorly, with a sign contrary to expecta­
tions but statistically insignificant. The cause for this may be in the 
construction of this variable. See Chapter VIII for details. The 
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problem may be in the selection of the prime rate as opportunity cost of 
capital, perhaps the long term corporate bond rate would be more appro­
priate. Secondly, the appreciation term or expected rate of inflation in 
air pollution abatement capital goods, is particularly difficult to 
model. Branson (7) cites the work of Joregenson and Bischoff as examples 
of studies that have modeled the expected price change of capital goods 
term using lag distributions of past price changes. Lag structures, 
while appropriate for time-series, are not so for a basically cross-
section model such as this one. Thus, the use of current period air 
pollution abatement plant and equipment price changes may not be 
capturing the expectations of future price changes. 
Another possible cause for the poor showing of the user cost of 
capital may be the log transformation (which is obviously nonlinear). 
Simple correlations between price of abatement and user cost of capital 
are positive but insignificant, while the log transformed user cost and 
price of abatement are correlated negatively and significantly. As 
mentioned in Appendix C, of all the variables investigated only user cost 
of capital and per capita income (which was not used) were affected to 
any large degree by the log transformation. While simple correlations 
are hardly proof, they do give some indications of possible problems. 
The last variable in the marginal cost equation is the stock of air 
pollution. The elasticity of abatement price with respect to the 
existing stock of air pollution is -0.511. That is to be expected. One 
environment that is 10 percent worse than another will experience a 5 
percent lower price in the process of abatement. In very dirty 
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environments, the marginal abatement units are less expensive, easier to 
bring about. Conversely, in cleaner environments additional abatement is 
costly. Continuing the previous example, in 1976 Texas's stock of air 
pollution was 22 tons per square mile, Rhode Island's was 34 tons. 
Marginal cost model parameter estimates The parameter estimates 
of the marginal cost equation are functions of the coefficient estimates. 
See Appendix B for details. Each parameter estimate is partially a 
function of the coefficient on the user cost of capital which was not 
statistically different from zero. The parameter estimates would be 
seriously biased to an unknown degree if calculated using zero values for 
the coefficient estimate of the user cost of capital. Therefore, the 
parameter estimates were not calculated. 
Comparison With Other Studies 
Elasticities 
There are only two studies that estimate price and income elastici­
ties of demand for air quality, Harrison and Rubinfeld (20) and Nelson 
(31). As the Harrison and Rubinfeld study has been approvingly cited by 
Freeman (14) and as both studies are on similar subjects, yielding 
similar results, the comparison will be confined to Harrison and 
Rubinfeld (hereafter known as H-R). This study uses the hedonic price 
technique as was discussed in Chapter III. They find an income elastic­
ity of demand of 1.0 and a price elasticity of -1.2. Their measure of 
income is household Income, and the implicit price is a willingness-to-
pay for sites with cleaner air. 
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The income and price elasticities of demand estimated from the study 
at hand are 0.48 and -0.27 respectively. The differences between the two 
studies are significant enough to account for the disparity, 
H-R uses a measure of air pollution (e.g., NO^ per cubic meter) as 
the quantity variable whereas the present study uses abatement of 
pollution. H-R uses individual households as observations whereas the 
present study focuses on states as the unit of observation with all the 
necessary aggregation that it implies. H-R is concerned with the air 
pollution just at the home residence, not at work, not out in the 
community, and not at recreation sites. The present study presents the 
median voter's aggregate demand for all those areas. Although the demand 
for air pollution abatement may be elastic with respect to price and 
Income in any or all of the different sites, there are fewer trade-offs 
after aggregation at the state level, resulting in a more inelastic 
curve. H-R is concerned with pollution from all sources, whereas the 
present study excludes mobile sources of air pollution. The framework of 
the two studies is different as well with the consumer able to freely 
choose between houses with good and bad air quality (along with their 
many other characteristics) in the H-R study. In the present study, to 
have a choice would mean a willingness to move out of state which most 
ordinary people won't do just for air quality. That unwillingness to 
move to different states with higher or lower implicit price of abatement 
builds an additional inelastic element into the model. In sum, then, one 
would not expect identical estimates from both studies. 
76 
Distribution impacts of air pollution policy 
Gianessi et al, (17) have argued that there are profound distribu­
tional impacts (who gets the benefits vs. who pays the cost) of air 
pollution policy. Specifically they find the benefits to be highly con­
centrated while the costs are widely dispersed. In the Gianessi study, 
benefits and damages (health, property and productivity) were assumed to 
be synonymous, meaning that those areas with the dirtiest air would get 
the greatest benefit. This also assumes, in the context of the present 
study, that abatement will equal emissions. Further, Gianessi rejects 
the public good aspect of air pollution/air pollution abatement in favor 
of a more private good approach (e.g., air quality as a costly attribute 
of housing). 
Baumol and Gates (3) argue that environmental programs, when viewed 
as public goods, will be worth more to the rich than poor because one, 
environmental goods are normal goods and two, the level of environmental 
quality, if provided through a median voter framework will be higher than 
that desired by the poor. In a Teibout world, they find different 
results. General improvements in environmental quality will benefit both 
rich and poor ("a rising tide lifts all boats") while minimum standards 
(such as demanded by the Clean Air Act) may have its primary impacts on 
poorer, dirtier neighborhoods. These conclusions are qualified (p. 203): 
First, although such programs may bring greater improvement 
measured in physical terms to areas of poorer residents, it 
cannot be stated unequivocally that the nature of these 
increases in environmental quality will be greater to the poor 
than to the rich. Depending on the geographical pattern of the 
improvements, the income elasticity of demand for environmental 
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quality, and current income differentials, the value in money 
terms of a lesser increase in, say, air quality may still be 
greater in rich, than in poor, areas, [emphasis in original] 
With the public good/median voter demand/marginal cost model used in 
the present study, the quality of the air in the state is determined by 
the level of abatement in the state (ignoring transboundary effects for 
the time being). The most likely amount of abatement undertaken will 
reflect the environment and tastes of the median voter. 
There are two ways that nonnormal distributions of income could 
affect the median voter's demand for abatement. One is through the 
income tax burden of paying for governmental monitoring and enforcement, 
the other is the consumption tax burden, placed on consumers by producers 
to fund the cost of private industry air pollution abatement. 
If, as likely, the distribution of income is positively skewed ("to 
the right"), then the average income will be above the median income. In 
this case, the median voter/income recipient will pay for government air 
pollution abatement activities at a bargain price if, as assumed in the 
present study, the funds for governmental monitoring and enforcement are 
raised through a proportional income tax. Therefore, with the median 
voter dominating, the greater the positive skewness to the income distri­
bution, ceteris paribus, the greater will be the funding of government 
enforcement of air pollution standards, resulting in more abatement. 
The second way that income distribution would affect the median 
voter/income recipient would be indirectly through air pollution abated-
caused price Increases in emitter goods. If the bundle of emitter goods 
78 
bearing the consumption tax was consumed equally by all income classes 
but constituted a larger portion of the income of those in the lower 
income classes, then the funding of private industry air pollution 
abatement could be seen as regressive. If the same amounts of emitter 
goods are not purchased by every Income class, then the distribution of 
income serves to distribute the costs of air pollution abatement. 
Consider, for example, a situation where 60% of income recipients get 
only 30% of total income. If the emitter industries in the state produce 
only bars of soap (with a consumption tax of a penny a bar) and every 
individual, rich or poor, uses 100 bars a year, then obviously, those 
receiving 30% of the income will pay 60% of the private industry air 
pollution abatement costs. If, on the other hand, the emitter industries 
produce only luxury motorcars, then those receiving 70% of the total 
income will be the only group able to purchase the goods and pay the 
consumption tax for air pollution abatement. In this latter case, those 
receiving 70% of the income pay 100% of the private industry air pollu­
tion abatement costs. 
Therefore, the median voter/income recipient's demand for air pollu­
tion abatement is affected by direct income distribution effects (propor­
tional Income tax for state government monitoring and enforcement) and 
indirect income distribution effects through consumption of emitter 
goods. The net effect is an empirical question. 
To test the strength and direction of these income distribution 
effects, a term reflecting the skewness of the income distribution is 
calculated for every state. This measure of skewness is appropriately 
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named the coefficient of skewness and is the third moment about the mean. 
See either Merrill and Fox (29, p. 3Iff) or Mood et al. (30, p. 75ff) for 
details. The coefficient of skewness was calculated from a distribution 
of family Income for 1975 given in the State and Metropolitan Area Data 
Book (45). Once calculated, the coefficient of skewness was assumed to 
be the same in all years of the study, 1974-1978. This assumption seeems 
reasonable in view that state income distributions probably change quite 
slowly over time. The model was reestimated including the coefficient of 
skewness as a variable (in log form to be consistent with the rest of the 
model) in the demand equation to try to capture the income distribution 
effects. The new results are shown in Table 9.02. 
The results in Table 9.02 show that inclusion of the coefficient of 
skewness alters none of the previous coefficient signs and perturbs the 
magnitudes and significances of previous coefficients only to a small 
degree. Some exceptions proved to be (1) the coefficient on price in the 
demand equation which became even more inelastic (-0.173 vs. -0.271), a 
result due to the isolation of the price term from the effects of income 
distribution, and (2) the magnitude and significance of the coefficient 
on the quantity term in the marginal cost equation. The coefficient 
estimate on the quantity grew (0.324 vs. 0.191) and the t-statistic 
improved (1.65 vs. 0.94) for marginal significance at the 10% level. 
This shows that the addition of the coefficient of skewness improves the 
predicted values of endogenous variables generated during the first stage 
2 
of 2SLS. Although the R 's for the first stage are not significantly 
higher, the inclusion of the coefficient of skewness may be, in the words 
Table 9.02. Estimation results including coefficient of skewness 
Demand Equation: 0 = f(Price, Y, ATT^, E/SM, SKEW) 
Technique P Y ATT^ E/SM SKEW 
(-)* (+) (+) (+) 
2SLS -0.173 0.441 0.385 0.702 1.562 0.85 
(-2.42)b (6.09) (4.18) (12.92) (4.76) 
Variable Definitions: 
P; per unit cost of abatement 
Y: gross personal income 
ATTg: ideological view of air quality, pro-environment > anti-
environment 
E/SM: stock of air pollution, emissions per square mile 
SKEW: coefficient of skewness 
&Signs as predicted by theory. 
^t-statistics. 
"^Sign is contrary to that predicted by theory. 
^Insignificant at the 0.10 level. 
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IQ w^, r, E/SM) 
Q Wg Wi r E/SM 
(+) (+) (+) (+) ( - )  
0.325 0.893 4.070 -O.I54C -0.649 0.33 
(1.65) (1.68) (7.81) (-0.98)* (-3.08) 
Variable Definitions: 
Q; quantity of air pollution abatement 
w : wage rate for government employees 
w^: wage rate for private industry employees engaged in air 
pollution abatement 
r: user cost of capital 
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of Gujarat! (19, p. 378), . . to [better] purify the stochastic 
explanatory variable [price, in the marginal cost equation] of the 
influence of the disturbance term [in the demand equation]," thus giving 
better estimation results. 
The coefficient estimate on the skewness variable proved to be 
positive, elastic (1.56) and with a significant t-statistic (4.76). The 
magnitude of the elasticity means that a 10 percent increase in the 
skewness of the income distribution increases the demand for air pollu­
tion abatement by almost 16 percent. The median voter/income recipient 
apparently feels that a positively skewed income distribution is much to 
his advantage: higher income classes pay more of the proportional income 
tax for government activities and income groups other than the median 
voter/income recipient's own pay a larger percentage of the consumption 
tax on emitter goods. The size of the abatement elasticity with respect 
to income distribution skewness suggests that the assumption that the 
median voter has the median income may be questionable. If voters in 
general have higher average incomes than the population in general, then 
the median voter would have an income higher than the median income 
recipient. If true, this would make the median voter more likely to 
demand more abatement, given that the bundle of emitter goods produced is 
such that the consumption tax will fall on the lower income classes, as 
demonstrated in a earlier example. The median voter will be better off, 
despite the higher income classes having to pay a larger amount for the 
government side of air pollution abatement, because the cost of 
government air pollution abatement activities is small compared to the 
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air pollution abatement expenditures undertaken by private industry which 
are financed through emitter goods price increases. In 1975, for 
instance, Pennsylvania state government spent $3.7M on air pollution 
abatement activities while private industry in Pennsylvania spent about 
$225M. Therefore, if the median voter has an income closer to the 
average Income, then a skewed income distribution would be much to his 
advantage. The strong showing of the coefficient of skewness makes this 
a distinct possibility and an avenue for further research. 
The present study finds income distribution to be a significant 
factor in the demand for air pollution abatement largely because there 
can be shifting of the costs of abatement from those who are decisive in 
determining the quantity of abatement demanded (the median voter) to 
others, most likely lower income classes, who may have very different 
demands for air pollution abatement. 
There is also the question of regional effects on the distribution 
of costs. To separate out the effects of regional factors on the cost of 
air pollution abatement, a series of regional dummies were included in 
the marginal cost equation. The results are reported in Table 9.03, with 
the region not having a dummy being the central states: Iowa, Nebraska, 
Minnesota, the Dakotas, Kansas and Missouri. Positive and significant 
coefficients for the Southeast, Southwest and West (marginally) indicate 
upward shifts in the intercept term in their respective marginal cost 
functions as compared with the central states baseline marginal cost 
function. Level of industrialization, industrial mix and geography 
largely account for these regions having higher marginal costs than the 
Table 9.03. Estimation results including coefficient of skewness and regional dummies using 
2SLS 
Demand Equation: Q = f(PRICE, Y, ATT^^, E/SM, SKEW) 
P Y ATT^ E/SM SKEW R^ 








Marginal Cost Equation: P = g(Q, w^, 
w w. r E/SM NE 
g 1 
r, E/SM NE, SE, SW, WE, ME, H/A) 
Q SE SW WE ME H/A R2 
0.39 
(2.35) 
1.40 2.99 -0.09 -0.59 -1.45 
(2.89) (6.47) (-0.69) (-3.45) (-5.65) 
0.60 1.20 0.35 0.04 0.18 
(2.53) (4.17) (1.44) (0.15) (0.44) 
0.57 
Dummy Variable Definitions: 
NE: CT, DE, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, RI, VT 
SE: AR, LA, AL, MS, TN, KY, WV, FL, GA, SC, NC, VA 
SW: AZ, NM, TX, OK 
WE: MT, WY, CO, IJT, ID, WA, OR, NV, CA 
ME: OH, IN, PA, MI, IL, WI 
H/A: HI, AK 
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central states. The Mideast results are something of a puzzle with the 
positive but insignificant coefficient, although the geography of the 
Mideast and central states is similar. New England, not surprisingly, 
has a negative coefficient, reflecting both its geographical situation 
(Altantic coast states, west-to-east flow of air) and its small 
industrial base. 
The demand equation is only marginally affected as might be expected 
although the coefficient on price Increased in absolute magnitude. The 
results, from including the dummy variables in the marginal cost 
equation, suggest that regional factors are important in the distribution 
of costs of air pollution abatement. 
Benefits of air pollution abatement 
The major benefits from air pollution abatement and the resulting 
clean air are (1) health benefits, (2) productivity benefits, and (3) 
property benefits. The health and property effects are generally 
considered to be very much more Important than the productivity effects 
(Gerking and Schulze (16)). Thus only health and property will be 
considered here. Both of these sets of benefits have been estimated 
using the hedonic price technique. Taking health effects first, the 
primary (and controversial) data consist of the health risk (mortality 
rates) in being exposed to different levels of air pollution. Then, from 
safety studies, a willingness-to-pay for a statistical death avoided is 
selected. Using the health risk and the willingness-to-pay measure, the 
benefits of lower pollution levels can be calculated. Crocker et al. 
86 
(10) calculated (p. 71) the urban benefits from reduced mortality: 
value of safety for 60% air pollution control (reduce particulate and SOg 
concentration by 60%). They found the average individual safety benefit 
to be between $34-$106 per year. Using a completely different method, 
Crocker et al. also (p. 149) 
. . . calculated, under some extremely crude assumptions 
and on the basis of only a single sample, [emphasis theirs] 
that the representative individual would be willing to pay an 
undiscounted lump sum of $25,000 to be in the clean rather than 
the dirty environment. 
Property studies (e.g.. Brookshire et al., (9)) calculate rent 
gradients as a function of pollution levels. Pollution is entered in log 
form into an otherwise linear hedonic equation, thus making the price 
(the coefficient on air quality) a function of the level of air quality. 
After estimation, different quantities (levels of air quality) can be 
substituted into the hedonic rent gradient equations, and the rent 
differentials calculated. But as Brookshire et al. note (p. 172): 
Due to the estimated functional form of the rent gradient, 
the calculated rent differential is dependent upon the value of 
all other variables [House characteristics and neighborhood 
characteristics]. 
Brookshire et al. calculate sale price differentials for particular 
neighborhoods in southern California. These sale price differentials are 
calculated on the basis of a 30% decrease in air pollution. The sale 
price differentials are annualized and divided by 12 to give the monthly 
rent differentials. This makes comparison of benefits among studies 
(health, property, and the present study) quite difficult. Brookshire 
et al. found that (p. 173) 
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Monthly rent differentials ranged from $15.44 to $45.92 for an 
improvement from fair to poor air quality [about a 30% 
improvement] and $33.17 to $128.46 for an improvement from fair 
to good air quality [another 30% improvement]. 
The present study estimates the demand curve for air pollution 
abatement as well as the marginal cost curve of providing abatement. The 
implicit price-quantity combinations derived from the expenditure data 
are assumed to represent a point of implicit market equilibrium hence the 
use of simultaneous equations' techniques. Therefore, consider Figure 
9.01 which represents just such a point of equilibrium: P* Q*. Now 
suppose a tough new federal standard was introduced requiring the 
doubling of the level of abatement - would the CTVs be better off? The 
increase might be from Q* to Q^. But that level of abatement comes 
at a per unit cost of P^, and the CTVs would only want Q™. In the 
presence of federal government regulation, the short side of the market 
can't win, and the CTVs are forced to pay P^Q^ - P Q for the additional 
abatement, and suffer a loss of consumer surplus equal to the shaded 
area. Clearly, as a result of the new regulations, the CTVs are worse 
off despite having cleaner air. 
The benefits studies to date make the implicit assumption of 
disequilibrium in the market for clean air. Consider Figure 9.02. 
For both types of previous hedonic benefit studies (health, prop­
erty), it is assumed that the level of abatement is less than desired. 
In this case, people would pay more for cleaner air or the situation 
where the abatement provided is at price P^. There is a gain in 
consumer surplus to be made (the shaded area) if abatement is increased 

















Figure 9.02 Initial disequilibrium in the market for air pollution 
abatement 
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Another difficulty in comparing benefit estimates from the health 
and property studies to Implied benefits In the present study concerns 
the nature of benefits of air quality vs. demand for air pollution 
abatement. 
Consider the following example. One could calculate the national 
health and productivity benefits from a reduced number of headaches per 
year. If aspirin were the only headache medicine, would the demand for 
aspirin yield information on the benefits of increased worker produc­
tivity, fewer sick days, fewer domestic disputes, lower suicide rates? 
Or would the demand curve for aspirin measure instead the benefits of 
lower priced aspirin? If someone purchases a 100 tablet bottle of 
aspirin for a dollar, does that mean the benefits of being free of a 
headache are two cents? It seems clear that to calculate the benefits of 
clean air one would need additional information beyond that provided by 
the demand curve for abatement. 
The following benefits are calculated on the basis of an exogenous 
improvement in state air quality, what it would have cost to achieve that 
level of abatement. Because the improvement is exogenous, the abatement 
costs foregone can be viewed as a measure of "benefits." 
From the marginal cost equation of the present study, an increase in 
abatement by 30% would increase price by 10%. Taking Iowa as an example 
using 1975 data, a 30% increase would boost abatement from 1,182,000 tons 
to 1,536,600 tons while price would increase from $25.14 per ton to 
$27.65 or an expenditure avoidance of $12.77M, Iowa would experience a 
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per capita benefit from air pollution abatement of $4.44 per year per 
person or $9.52 a year per person for a 60% Increase in abatement. 
Similarly for California in 1975, a 30% increase in abatement would 
be worth $4.91 per capita per year while a 60% increase would be worth 
$10.51. 
On the demand side, the potential benefits could be calculated by 
determining how far price would have to fall to produce a 30% and a 60% 
increase in the demand for abatement. Given the low elasticities 
involved (estimates are -0.173 and -0.271 for price elasticity of demand 
for abatement), the price of abatement would have to fall over 100%. In 
the case of zero price, the entire cost of present abatement would be the 
potential benefit. In the examples cited above, zero cost of abatement 
to state residents would produce $10.35 in benefits per year per person 
in Iowa, and a figure of $11.42 for California. 
Summary of Findings 
The present study uses median voter dominance to model the demand 
for air pollution abatement and cost minimization behavior on the part of 
state governments and private industry to derive the marginal cost curve 
for abatement. Although it uses the median voter model, the present 
study does not test it against competing theories; thus, the present 
study does not provide additional evidence as to the adequacy of the 
median voter model, other than to say that It seems to work well in this 
context. The question of whether governments provide services (such as 
air pollution abatement) at least cost (as is partially assumed in the 
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present model) remains an arguable point in the literature. No 
additional light is shed on that question in the present study. 
On the demand side, all of the variables that influence the quantity 
of abatement demanded, except the coefficient of skewness, were found to 
be moderately to highly inelastic. The reasons why this is so in each 
case vary, but the overall effect is that the quantity of air pollution 
being abated in each state resists change. Put another way, the factors 
that Influence the demand for air pollution abatement do so weakly. The 
magnitude of change required in the independent variables before signif­
icant change can be made in quantity abated is quite large. This should 
not be an unexpected result given that much of the impetus for air pollu­
tion abatement comes from the federal government. The states are 
somewhat limited in the range of abatement they can accommodate; 
abatement requirements far beyond the federal standards would discourage 
new industries from coming in and would act as an incentive for 
industries presently located in the state to relocate to less demanding 
areas. Abatement enforcement that is too slack on the other hand may 
invite federal intervention or lawsuits from environmentally minded state 
residents. Therefore, states and private industries do react to the 
forces of demand but the effect is muted. 
The present study does provide some new demand-for-air-pollution-
abatement information to decision makers in private industry, state and 
federal government. First, many of the factors are those over which the 
decision makers have little control; gross state income, cost of 
abatement, skewness of the income distribution. Even so, as shown, with 
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the exception of skewness, these factors are Inelastic In their 
influence. The factors that decision makers can effect are attitudes and 
stock of air pollution. Attitudes about the environment are malleable to 
some degree as shown by the overall effectlvenss of anti-lltter 
campaigns. Although the attitudes elasticity is low (0.39), many areas 
are characterized by very weak preferences for environmental quality, 
hence there is room for large percentage Increases in their attitudes. 
As for the stock of air pollution, it is useless as a control variable: 
if one wished to increase the demand for air pollution abatement it would 
be perverse to further dirty the environment to achieve that. The rule 
of thumb for decision makers thus far from the demand side is pretty much 
"steady as she goes." 
Another result from the demand side is the elastic (1.56) 
coefficient of skewness measuring the skewness of the income 
distribution. This should give pause to those who order up air pollution 
abatement willingly on the presumption that costs and benefits are 
equitably shared by rich and poor alike. The result from the present 
study is that the greater the income distribution skewness (the larger 
the percentage of income in a smaller number of hands), the higher the 
demand for abatement. This would infer that those who are decisive in 
determining the level of air pollution abatement get an increasingly 
better deal in terms of paying for abatement as the income distribution 
becomes more skewed "to the right." 
Overall then, the present study provides decision makers with a 
feeling for what factors Influence the demand for abatement (and hence 
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their controlability) and an indication that there are equity questions 
involved in the level of air pollution abatement provided. 
The marginal cost side of the model is somewhat more traditional 
with the independent variables being factor prices plus the air pollution 
stock variable. Of great interest to decision makers is the elasticity 
of the marginal cost curve. As pointed out earlier, the magnitude of the 
elasticity has a definite bearing on which air pollution policy should be 
selected from a reduction in social cost of error point of view. Given 
the estimated low elasticity of marginal cost with respect to quantity, a 
policy of direct regulation or auction of a fixed quantity of pollution 
rights is preferred. Direct regulation is the present method of air 
pollution control. Therefore, the present study confirms the correctness 
of the general choice of air pollution abatement policy. The remaining 
marginal cost variable coefficients while insightful in other contexts, 
provide little information that can be acted upon by decision makers. 
Comparison of studies estimating the benefits of air quality 
improvement to the present study is fraught with both conceptual and 
practical problems, the most significant of which are the determination 
benefits of air quality (which is undertaken in other studies) versus the 
demand for air pollution abatement (which is undertaken in the present 
study) and disequilibrium (other studies) versus equilibrium (present 
study) analysis. 
The theoretical model moves median voter analysis into uncharted 
waters by attempting to incorporate costs and benefits that cross juris­
dictional boundaries. Unfortunately, little hard empirical evidence was 
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discovered that could shed light on the magnitude and direction of these 
cost/benefit flows. The theoretical model posits an estimable marginal 
cost function for a public good (air pollution abatement) and analyzes 
this marginal cost function simultaneously with the demand function. 
From a simultaneous equations point of view, the empirical results are 
encouraging and indicative of the benefits to be gained from abandoning 
the assumption of exogenous public good supply. 
There are several avenues for further research. One would be to use 
more sophisticated econometric techniques In dealing with pooled time-
series cross-section data. A good example, cited by Plndyck and 
Rubinfeld, is Heller (21). A second would be disaggregation of total air 
pollution into its component parts. Not only do different air pollutants 
most likely have different effects on individuals (and hence their demand 
for abatement), but the individual states air pollution load varies 
widely among states in its composition. A third extension would be to 
Investigate the effects of Including mobile source air pollution/ 
abatement into the model. Much of the urban air pollution seems to be 
directly related to automobile emissions. Since the 1970s was largely 
the decade of automobile emissions control, there would seem to be much 
that could be learned by such an extension. A fourth possibility would 
be to investigate in greater depth the regional effects on air pollution 
abatement, that is, for example, are different factors of different 
importance in New England and the West? A fifth, but no means final, 
extension would be to utilize disequilibrium analysis rather than 
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assuming that the implicit price - quantity of abatement combinations in 
each state represent points of equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX A; IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF AIR POLLUTION 
Case 1: Imports = Exports ()j = 1) 
Consider a hypothetical state. 
Let: 
Q : actual abatement equal 100 tons. 
a 
Q^: abatement needed for instate emitter sources equal 100 tons. 
Qg: exported pollution, that otherwise would be abated, equal 20 
tons. 
Qg: imported pollution that must be compensated for, equal 20 
tons. 
Qa " Qa - Qa + 
=  1 0 0  - 2 0 + 2 0  
Q = 100 tons 
a 
As 100 tons of abatement is needed for instate sources and 100 tons 
is actually abated 
100 tons of instate abatement needed ^ ^  
' 100 tons of instate abatement 
From 5.02 it is seen that y must equal one. 
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Case 2: Exports > Imports (u < 1) 
Let : 
Q : 100 tons. 
a 
Q^: 120 tons. 
Q*; 40 tons. 
Q™: 20 tons. 
Qa = SI - Qa + 0% 
= 120 -40+20 
Q =100 tons 
a 
Notice that the requirement for instate industry air pollution 
abatement is achieved through the sum of instate abatement and net 
exports. 
As 120 tons is needed and 100 tons is actually abated instate then 
120 
A.2 f = ÎÔÔ = 1-2' 
With = 1.2, then p = 0.96 showing the state to be a net exporter. 
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Case 3: Imports > Exports (p > 1) 
Let: 
0 : 100 tons, 
a 
QS 80 tons. 
Q*: 20 tons. 
: 40 tons. 
Qa " - Qa + 0% 
= 80 - 20 + 40 
Q = 100 tons 
a 
Notice that despite an instate abatement requirement of 80 tons, 
actual abatement instate is 100 tons due to the presence of net imports 
of 20 tons. 
As 80 tons is needed and 100 tons is actually abated instate then 
on 
'^3 4 = 0-8' 
With = 0.8, then n = 1.05, showing the state to be a net importer 
of air pollution. 
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APPENDIX B: SOLUTION OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS IN TERMS OF 
MODEL COEFFICIENTS 
The coefficients in the marginal cost equation are combinations of 
the structural parameters of the marginal cost function: 




ap + ÏÏ + (|) 
1 - (ap + n + (|)) 
0P 
1 - (ap + TT + (|)) 
IT ' 
1 - (ap + ÏÏ + <j)) 
B.05 
4 * 
Solving B.Ol - B.04 gives the following 
^1 ap 
Bg ap + ÏÏ + (|)' 
B.06 — = 
B.07 
ap + ÏÏ + (|)' 
3^  ap + ÏÏ + ij)' 
Solving B.06 and B.07 gives (}> in terms of ir, solving B.05 and B.06 
gives ap in terms of n, substituting in B.03 gives 
^2^4 B.08 ÏÏ 
*2*3 + *2*4 + *3*4 + *2*3*4' 
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Solving B.05 and B.07 gives op in terms of ([), solving B.06 and B.07 
gives IT in terms of (|), substituting in B.04 gives 
* • 6263 + S2P4 + 636^ + 
The individual parameters a and p cannot be disentangled from their 
product op. The product can be solved for using the results determined 
above (op in terms of tr and 4") and substituting them in B.05; 
2^ ^3 ^4 
"• • 6263 + @2 «4 + ®3«4 + 6283®/,' 
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APPENDIX C; COEFFICIENTS ON GROSS AND PER CAPITA INCOME 
Consider part of the demand equation as it appears in Chapter IX; 
C.l In = o(Q - Oj In P^ + «2 In Y + . . . . 
Given that Income Y and per capital income Y/N are related by 
C.2 Y = (§) ' N, 
C.2 can be substituted in C.l to give 
C.3 In = OQ - In P^ + «2 In • n) + . . . . 
Expanding the income term yields 
C.4 In = oy - Oj In P^^ + In ^  ^ + . . . . 
Estimating C.4 yields (t-statistics): 
C.5 In = «Q - Oj In P^^ + In ^  In N + . . . 
0.35 -0.15 -0.12 0.44 
(0.08) (-2.13) (-0.25) (5.95) 
Estimating C.3 yields 
C.6 In = Qg - Oj In P^^ + Og In Y + . . . 
-4.61 -0.17 0.44 
(-4.64) (-2.42) (6.09) 
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Two of the «g's are the same while the third, the coefficient on per 
capita income, is statistically no different than zero. An analysis of 
the simple correlations involved shows the unlogged values of and Y/N 
are positively and significantly correlated (p = 0.16). With unlogged 
and logged Y/N the correlation is still postiive and significant (p = 
0.22) but when both and Y/N are logged, the correlation is small, 
negative and insignificant (p = 0.044). Another variable to behave in a 
similar manner is the user cost of capital, which similarly switched 
signs after the log transformation. The remaining simple correlations 
between the dependent and independent variables were only marginally 
affected by the nonlinear transformation used in this model. This 
suggests that the phenomenon of negative but insignificant coefficient 
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